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 CHAPTER 1 
 
Rationale for Undertaking the Research  
 
This research proposal was initially developed in 2005. At the time, the Irish dairy 
farming sector was undergoing a period of substantial change. The Medium Term 
Review (MTR) of the CAP, agreed in 2003, was introduced in 2005. This policy 
agreement allowed for the decoupling of all direct payments from production as well as 
agreeing a reduction in the intervention prices for butter and skim milk powder. Ex-ante 
analyses of the policy proposal predicted that the policy would expedite the process of 
structural change in dairy farming, with an increased number of farmers likely to exit the 
sector following the milk price reductions. These studies suggested that the future 
viability of dairy farming, following the MTR, would be largely dependent on the efficient 
transfer of resources between exiting farmers and those wishing to expand production.  
 
Up to this time, milk quota transfer between farmers in Ireland operated exclusively 
through the milk quota restructuring scheme. Following the policy reform, officials at the 
Department of Agriculture, in conjunction with the main industry stakeholders, were 
considering changing the structures governing the transfer of milk quota between 
farmers. The importance of reviewing the milk quota transfer mechanism was 
acknowledged by the Agri-Vision 2015 committee. The Agri-Vision 2015 report, 
published in 2005, recommended that the reallocation of quota between farmers needed 
to be made more flexible and more responsive to farmers’ needs. The report called for 
an examination of the current quota reallocation process, with a view to ensuring that it 
was not in conflict with the emergence of a competitive low cost milk production 
structure.  
 
It was in this context that the project proposal was developed. The aim of the project 
was to produce quality, scientific based policy advice on the most efficient means for the 
transfer of milk quota between dairy farmers. The main objective of the project was to 
identify milk quota transfer mechanisms that would ensure the viability of the maximum 
number of farmers in Ireland while still supporting an internationally competitive 
agricultural sector.   
 
During the course of the project the Irish Department of Agriculture introduced a new 
milk quota transfer scheme. The milk quota exchange scheme was launched in 
November 2006. At this stage the objectives of the project were altered to be more 
policy relevant. Rather than exploring the efficiency of various milk quota transfer 
models, the aim of the project was redirected to explore the efficiency of the scheme as 
it was operated in Ireland. The rationale for this change was to provide relevant and 
timely feedback to policy makers on the operation of the new scheme.  
 
While the MTR agreement guaranteed the continuation of the EU milk quota regime until 
2014/15, it also made provisions for a review of the milk quota system to be conducted 
in 2008. Clearly any changes to EU milk quota policy would have implications for farmers 
in Ireland. A second objective of this project was to explore some policy scenarios that 
may transpire from the milk quota review and to estimate the implications for farmers in 
Ireland.  
 
2. Research Approach  
 
The main objectives of the project can be broken down into three tasks and each task 
required a different research approach. The tasks and research approaches adopted 
were as follows;  
 
(1) To examine the efficiency of the milk quota exchange scheme  
This objective here was to examine the operation of the milk quota exchange scheme in 
Ireland and to explore the implications for sector efficiency. To this end, an optimisation 
model was developed to estimate the economic value of quota. National Farm Survey 
(NFS) data for Ireland and FAPRI-Ireland price projections were used to estimate the 
economic value of quota for each dairy farmer in the survey. The optimisation model 
used a linear programming framework where farm profit was maximized subject to the 
physical and financial constraints on the farm and the policy related constraints, such as 
the milk quota. The economic value of quota was estimated as the sum of the 
discounted stream of annual cashflows between the current period and the period when 
quota is abolished. Individual economic values were then aggregated to derive quota 
sale and purchase curves. The intersection of the supply and demand curves indicated 
the equilibrium milk quota value. The model was run under a number of scenarios, (i) 
where quotas were only allowed to trade regionally so as to reflect the ring-fencing 
system and (ii) where quotas were allowed to trade nationally. Through the derivation of 
sectoral cumulative cost curves it is possible to estimate the impact of regionalising 
quota trade on sector efficiency. 
 
(2) To examine the implications of a reform to the EU milk quota regime 
The FAPRI-Ireland partnership group of models were used to examine the implications 
of changes to EU milk quota policy. The policy reform was first examined at an 
aggregate level using the Ireland and EU models. There are econometrically estimated 
partial equilibrium models of the agriculture sector that are solved under various policy 
scenarios to produce estimates of changes in the prices of inputs and outputs. These 
price and cost projections are then used in the FAPRI-Ireland farm level models to 
examine the implications of the policy change for farmers.  First a set of profit 
maximising linear programming models are solved annually for each farm participating 
in the NFS. Farm net margin is maximised subject to physical, financial and policy 
related constraints. The LP models are then supplemented with three exogenous models 
of farmer behaviour. The first model estimates the effect of policy on the rate of entry 
and exit from farming and thus farm numbers by developing a multinomial logit model 
of farmer retirement and succession decisions. Second, the effect of policy on the 
number of part-time farmers is estimated using a two-step sample selected corrected 
labour supply model and finally the decision to exit dairy production is estimated using a 
profit simulation model.  
 
 
(3) To examine the implications of milk quota reform for farm production 
systems  
The Moorepark Dairy Systems model (MDSM) was used to estimate the effect of a 
change in policy or milk quota transfer mechanisms on dairy farm production practices 
and overall farm profitability.  The MDSM is a stochastic budgetary simulation model 
formulated within a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet. The model integrates animal inventory 
and valuation, milk supply, feed requirement, land and labour utilisation and economic 
analysis. Variable costs (fertiliser, contractor charges, medical and veterinarian, AI, 
silage, reseeding), fixed costs (machinery, maintenance and running costs, farm 
maintenance, car, telephone, electricity and insurance) and prices (calf, milk and cow) 
are based on current prices. The feeds offered (grass, grass silage and concentrate) are 
determined by the MDSM meeting the net energy requirement for milk production, 
maintenance and live-weight change. The model was estimated under different milk 
quota scenarios to investigate how the optimal milk production system changes under 
each scenario.  
 
 
3. Research Achievements 
 
The main research results or achievements can be summarised under the three 
objectives outlined above.  
 
(1) Summary results on the efficiency of the milk quota exchange scheme  
The milk quota exchange scheme as it currently operates was simulated during the 
course of the project. To simulate the effect of ring-fencing, four regional markets for 
milk quota were estimated; the Border Midlands West region, the Southwest region, the 
East region and the South region. The results showed that the economic value of quota 
varied across the four regions, from 25 cent per litre (CPL) in BMW, 30.3 CPL in the 
East, 39.5CPL in the Southwest and 36CPL in the south. The results showed that if ring-
fencing was abolished and quotas could trade nationally, the economic value of milk 
quota would be 35CPL. The implication is that if Ireland shifted to national milk quota 
trade, quota would move out of the BMW and East regions and into the South West. 
Results showed that the shift from a ring-fenced to a national quota exchange had only 
a negligible effect on total farm numbers, with numbers falling only 1.5 percent faster 
when quota is traded nationally. However, farm numbers declined substantially faster in 
the BMW and East regions when quota is traded nationally.  
 
The implications for sector efficiency were measured using sector cumulative cost curves 
developed under the two scenarios. Under national trade the aggregate milk supply 
would be produced at a cost of €818.7 million. Under the regional scenario the cost was 
estimated at  €845.9 million, approximately €27million or 3 percent higher. It follows 
then that the practice of ring-fencing quota trade to particular regions introduces an 
inefficiency of approximately €27 million.  
 
The results of the model were also compared to actual milk quota trade prices garnered 
from the first three exchanges. The results showed, as would be expected through 
economic theory, that there is a divergence between the value of quota and its trade 
price and that this divergence is more pronounced in some regions. In particular, quota 
is very overpriced in co-operatives in the south and east meaning that farmers are 
overpaying for milk quota in these regions.  
 
(2) Summary results on the implications of a reform to the EU milk quota 
regime 
Two milk quota expansion scenarios were analysed. Scenario 1 involved a 3 percent 
increase in the Irish national milk quota in 2008/09, while Scenario 2 involved a series of 
3 percent increases from 2008 to 2014 totalling 21percent. Both scenarios assumed 
quota abolition in 2015. The effects of the scenarios were measured against a baseline 
which assumed the EU milk quota continued unchanged over the period. Results showed 
that milk prices would decline under the two milk quota expansion scenarios. By 2014 
milk prices would be 4 percent lower under Scenario 1 and 7 percent lower under 
Scenario 2.  
 
Under Scenario 1 the results showed that, up to the point of quota elimination, the milk 
quota increase would be insufficient to offset the milk price decline and as a 
consequence farmers would be worse off. The results for Scenario 2 were more positive. 
The milk quota increases were sufficient to off set the milk price decline and as a result 
the typical producer increasing production by 3 percent per year would be better off 
than in the baseline. However, there are winners and losers under this Scenario. 
Farmers operating in regions with lower than average milk quota exchange prices would 
be better off under existing policy, as they have access to cheap quota and milk prices 
are higher. In general the results support that the Irish dairy sector would benefit from 
larger and faster increases in the milk quota.  
 
(3) Summary results on the implications for production systems 
When milk quota is limiting, farm profit is maximised by minimising production costs. 
When the quota is no longer limiting, most farms will find that land is the most limiting 
resource. In this case, the optimal production system involves maximising the utilisation 
of grass while at the same time minimising the requirement for purchased feed. The 
Moorepark Dairy Systems model was run to determine the optimum system of 
production under the various milk quota scenarios. The results suggest that when milk 
quota is no longer binding, dairy farmers will maximise profit by increasing the stocking 
rate on the grazing platform. The current optimal stocking rate around the existing 
grazing platform is 1.8 cows per hectare. The analysis showed that this optimal would 
increase to 2.8 cows per hectare if there was no quota constraint on production.  
Results also showed that when the milk quota constrains production, the optimal mean 
calving date is mid to late February. When the quota constraint is relaxed the optimal 
calving date shifts to mid to early February. An important factor affecting the optimal 
calving date is the compactness of calving. Where 50 percent of cows are calved in 2 
weeks and 90 percent are calved in 6 weeks, these calving dates should be later by one 
week in order to have good synchrony between supply and demand.  
 
The research on milk quota expansion/abolition shows that the optimal production 
system would change in the following way;  
o The mean calving date would be earlier, Feb 15th rather than March 15th 
o Stocking rates would increase from 1.8 cows per hectare to 2.8 
o Strategic use of supplementation to aid grassland management 
o Increased focus on genetic selection of animals based on the Economic Breeding 
Index (EBI) 
 
4. Impact of the Research 
 
The main research results have been outlined above. The dissemination of results and 
the impact of the research can be summarised under three main headings;  
 
Policy Advice 
The main objective of this research project was to provide scientific advice to policy 
makers on the effect of policy proposals/policy reform. Policy advice constituted one of 
the major outputs or impact factors for the project. The EU milk quota regime scenarios 
that were analysed were selected in consultation with policy officials from the 
Department of Agriculture. They were selected on the basis of being a possible outcome 
of the CAP Health Check, which was ongoing at the time. The scenarios were analysed 
and results were made available to policy officials and other industry stakeholders at a 
public conference. The main impact of this research was the provision of 
advice/information to policy makers in a timely fashion, i.e. while negotiations were still 
ongoing.  
 
The other major piece of policy analysis conducted during the course of the project was 
the evaluation of the milk quota exchange scheme. Again at the request of policy 
officials in the Department of Agriculture, the operation of the scheme was evaluated 
with a view to estimating its efficiency and the implications for farmers’ viability. The 
results of this analysis are outlined above and were also presented to policy makers at 
the time. This allowed those involved in formulating the milk quota exchange regulations 
to act on the information if they wished.  
 
Following the completion of these two pieces of policy analyses, members of the 
research team were invited to address the Minister’s Dairy Stakeholder forum, this is a 
high level meeting of industry stakeholders convened by the Minister.  
 
Stakeholder Interaction 
Dissemination of results to stakeholders constituted another major output or impact 
factor for the project. Some of the models developed during the course of the project 
produced results that were of direct relevance to farmers. In particular, the Moorepark 
model was used to estimate the maximum affordable price farmers should bid for quota. 
This information was disseminated to farmers at a very opportune time, i.e. just before 
the first milk quota exchange took place. These meetings, of which there were 15 
around the country, provided farmers with valuable information on how the milk quota 
exchange would work and on what prices they should consider bidding. This activity 
contributed to the success of the first milk quota exchange scheme.  
The analysis of the implications of EU milk quota reform and the implications for the 
optimal production system were also disseminated to farmers. Presentations were made 
at the Teagasc National dairy conference and a number of popular articles were 
published. Again the major impact of the research in this regard was to minimise the 
information gap that existed for stakeholders on what the future may hold with respect 
to milk quota policy.   
 
Scientific Publications 
A number of academic peer reviewed journal articles were published during the course 
of the project. These papers showcase the methodologies employed in the research 
rather than the actual results. The main objective is to ensure quality control in relation 
to the methods used in the research. Another major outcome or impact of this activity is 
to contribute to the intellectual/scientific understanding of how quotas operate.  
 
5. Exploitation of the Research  
 
 
The objective of this project was to conduct research on a number of issues pertaining 
to milk quota policy with a view to providing evidence based policy advice to 
government. As such, the objectives of the project were not to generate any new 
technology or intellectual property that could be adopted by industry.  
 
The recommendations arising from this research have been presented to officials at the 
Department of Agriculture, to officials at Teagasc and a large number of industry 
stakeholders at conferences and various other fora.  The policy recommendations have 
been well aired and made publicly available. However, give the slow pace at which 
policy making occurs, it is as yet difficult to comment on whether the information 
produced by this project has been exploited. 
 6. Summary of Research Outputs 
 
(a) Intellectual Property applications/licences/patents 
N/A 
 
(b) Innovations adopted by industry 
N/A 
 
 
(c) Number of companies in receipt of information 
 N/A 
 
(d) Outcomes with economic potential  
N/A 
 
(e) Outcomes with national/ policy/social/environmental potential 
N/A  
 
(f) Peer-reviewed publications, International Journal/Book chapters. 
 
Lovett D.k., Shalloo L., Dillon P. and O’Mara F.P. 2008. Greenhouse gas emissions from 
pastoral based dairying systems: the effect of uncertainty and management change 
under two contrasting production systems. Livestock Science. (In Press) 
 
Dillon, P.G., Hennessy, T., Shalloo, L. and Thorne, F. (2008). Future outlook for the Irish 
dairy industry: a study of international competitiveness, influence of international trade 
reform and  requirement for change. International Journal of Dairy Technology Vol 61 
(1) 16-29  ISSN 1364 
 
Hennessy T, Shrestha, S. Shalloo L and Wallace, M (2008). The Inefficiencies of 
Regionalised Trade of Milk Quota. Journal of Agricultural Economics. . Vol. 60. No. 2. 
334-347 
 
 
Smyth, P., Butler, A.M. and Hennessy (2008). Explaining the variability in the Economic 
Performance of Irish Dairy Farmers 1998-2006. Journal of International Farm 
Management. Vol. 4 (4) 1-18.    
 
(g) Scientific abstracts or articles including those presented at conferences  
 
Hennessy, T. (2007). CAP Health Check Analysis: Farm Level Implications of EU Milk 
Quota Expansion. Proceedings of the FAPRI-Ireland Outlook 2007 Conference, Dublin. 
 
Breen J, Hennessy T and Thorne F (2007). FAPRI-Ireland Baseline 2007: Farm Level 
Analysis. Proceedings of the FAPRI-Ireland Outlook 2007 Conference, Dublin. 
 
Donnellan, T. and Hennessy, T. (2007). The Effect of Milk Quota Expansion on EU/Irish 
Production. Proceedings of the Teagasc National Dairy Conference, Kilkenny, November 
21st.  
 
Donnellan, T. and Hennessy, T. (2007). The Effect of Milk Quota Expansion on EU/Irish 
Production. Proceedings of the Teagasc National Dairy Conference, Castlebar, November 
22nd.  
 
Hennessy, T. (2007). Prospects for Dairy Expansion. Invited Paper to the Irish Co-
operative Organisation Society’s Annual Conference. CityWest Hotel, Dublin. November 
2007.  
 
Shrestha. S and Hennessy. T (2007) Simulating a market for milk quota under policy 
reforms: an Irish study. Paper presented at the annual British Agricultural Economics 
Society, Reading April 2007.  
 
Shrestha. S and Hennessy. T (2007) Simulating a regional market for milk quota. Paper 
presented at the Agricultural Research Forum.   
 
Shrestha. S., Hennessy. T, Shallo, L., and Dilon, P.  (2006) Estimating the Supply and 
Demand of Milk Quota in Ireland. Rural Economy Working Paper Series, WPRE19– 
www.tnet.teagasc.ie/rerc/workingpapers.  
 
Shalloo L. and Dillon P. (2006). Is milk quota Worthless? New Vision for the Irish Dairy 
Industry. Teagasc National Dairy Conference.Wednesday 15th of November, South 
Court Hotel Limerick, Page 9-15. 
 
Shalloo, L., O'Donnell, S. and Horan, B. (2007). Milk production after quotas. Teagasc IE 
p. 24-28  ISSN 1 84170 486 5   13711 
 
Shalloo, L., O'Donnell, S. and Horan, B. (2007). Profitable dairying in an increased EU 
milk quota scenario. Exploiting the Freedom to Milk. In Proceedings of the Teagasc 
National Dairy Conference. Wednesday and Thursday 21th and 22nd of November, 
Lyrath Hotel Kilkenny and Breaffy House Hotel Castlebar, Page 20-44. 
 
French, P, Shalloo, L., Donworth, J. and Horan, B. (2007). A roadmap for high profit 
dairy systems in  the future. Teagasc IE p. 5-14  ISSN 1 84170 486 5   13710  
 
Smyth, P., Butler, A. and Hennessy, T. (2008) The economics of dairy farming in 
Ireland. Paper presented at the AES Conference, Cirencester, England 
 
Hennessy T, Shrestha, S. Shalloo L and Wallace, M (2008). The Inefficiencies of 
Regionalised Trade of Milk Quota. Rural Economocy Working Paper Series.  
 
 
(h) National Report 
 
Shrestha. S., Hennessy. T, Shalloo, L., and Dilon, P.  (2006) Estimating the Supply and 
Demand of Milk Quota in Ireland. Discussion Paper Submitted to the Irish Department of 
Agriculture.  
 
Shalloo L. and Dillon P. (2006). Milk quota pricing and policy in a decoupled milk price 
environment. Document submitted to the Department of Agriculture in May 2006. 
 
(i) Popular non-scientific publications 
 
N/A 
 
(j) Workshops/seminars/ open days at which results were presented (excluding 
those in (g)) 
 
Hennessy, T. (2007). Competitiveness at the farm level: preparing for a freer dairy 
market. Presentation to the Minister’s National Dairy Forum. Dublin July 26th 
 
Hennessy, T. (2007). Update on milk quota transfer modelling. Presentation to 
Department of Agriculture Officials. DAF Offices, Dublin. July 17th   
 
 
Donnellan, T, Hennessy, T and Thorne, F, (2007) World Trade Talks and the EU Milk 
Quota Regime – The Time for Reform? Paper presented at the annual British Agricultural 
Economics Society, Reading April 2007. 
 
Stakeholders’ Consultation on the Future of Milk Quotas – Held in Moorepark on 
November 8th.  
 
Proceedings of Stakeholders’ Consultation 
 
Hennessy T (2006) Prospects for the Irish Dairy Sector. Presentation made to the 
Stakeholders’ Consultation.  
 
Shalloo L (2006) What to pay for milk quota? Presentation made at 15 farm meetings 
nationwide in the October November period.   
 

 CHAPTER 2 
 
ECONOMICS OF DAIRY FARMING IN IRELAND 
 
 
Paul Smyth 1&2, Anne Marie Butler2 and Thia Hennessy1, 
1Rural Economy Research Centre, Teagasc, Athenry, Co. Galway, Ireland 
2School of Agriculture, Food Science and Veterinary Medicine, University College Dublin, 
Ireland1 
 
2.1.  Introduction 
Recent studies of dairy production around the EU have highlighted the cost efficiencies 
achieved at farm level. For example, Colman and Zhuang (2005) estimated that the 
English and Welsh dairy farming sector achieved on average a 1.5 percent reduction per 
annum in total costs of production in the period 1996 to 2003. Pierani and Rizzi (2003) 
conducted an economic analysis of Italian specialist dairy farms and concluded that cost 
savings of 3.5 percent per annum were realised in the period 1980 to 1992. Thorne and 
Fingleton (2006) have shown that Ireland was consistently one of the lowest cost 
producers of milk in the EU between 1996 and 2004. Further analysis conducted by 
Fingleton (2004) showed that cost efficiencies were achieved by the Irish dairy farming 
sector from the late 1990s to the early 2000s but that a large variation in costs between 
farms continued throughout the time period. Fingleton’s analysis shows that the 
difference in costs of production between the best performing 20 percent of farms and 
the poorest 20 percent was 11 cent per litre in 2000, which is a cost difference of 
€27,500 for the average quota size of 250,000 litres. Such a large variation in cost 
structure is surprising in a small homogenous country like Ireland.  
 
Figure 2.1 presents Irish National Farm Survey data on production costs on specialist 
milk producers for 2000, 2003 and 2006. The average for the weighted population is 
presented and the population is also divided into quintiles on the basis of production 
costs. As is evident from the graph, there is significant variation in production costs 
                                                 
1 The authors would like to thank the staff of the Teagasc National Farm Survey for the provision of the 
data.  
across farms. The range in costs between the lowest and highest quintiles was 10 cent 
per litre (cpl) in 2000, and increased to 12 cpl in 2006, thus showing that the variation 
between producers is increasing. The quintile analysis also reveals the varying degree to 
which farmers can cope with cost inflation or adverse weather conditions. As can be 
seen, the very high cost farms increased total production costs by 16 percent from 2003 
to 2006 while costs on very low cost farms only increased by 5 percent over the same 
period.  
Figure 2. 1:  Mean Total Cost of Production per litre on Specialist Irish Dairy 
Farms  
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To date relatively little analysis has been conducted in Ireland on the factors affecting 
cost structures and the reasons for such large variations in costs between farms. The 
objective of this paper is to draw on research conducted internationally to develop 
empirical models to explain cost structures in the Irish dairy sector. The paper begins by 
describing the dataset used; following this the methodology adopted in the paper is 
outlined, while the final two sections of the paper present and discuss the key findings 
of the research.  
 
2.2.  Data 
Irish National Farm Survey data (NFS) from 1998 to 2006 is used to compile and analyse 
production costs on dairy farms. The NFS is a member of the Farm Accountancy Data 
Network of Europe and surveys approximately 1200 farms annually. These farms are 
assigned a weighting factor which enables an aggregation process to represent the full 
farming population of approximately 115,000 farms.  For the purposes of this study only 
the data collected on dairy farms is used, this is a sample of approximately 340 farms in 
each year.   
 
The NFS data collection process allocates direct costs of production to specific farm 
enterprises; see Connolly et al (2006).  This facilitates the calculation of direct costs of 
production per unit of output. However, overhead or fixed costs are not assigned to 
individual enterprises, this is problematic when the majority of dairy farms in Ireland are 
mixed enterprise farms. In this paper fixed costs are allocated on the basis of gross 
output. For the dairy enterprise for example, fixed costs are calculated by estimating the 
proportion of total farm gross output emanating from the dairy enterprise and allocating 
an equivalent amount of fixed costs to the dairy enterprise.  In the analysis only cash 
costs are considered. The cost of the farmer’s own labour and land are not included in 
this analysis.  Previous studies of cost efficiency have attempted to impute owned labour 
and land costs, see for example Franks (2001). Due to the heterogeneity of land and 
labour and the consequent difficulty of sourcing appropriate valuations for both 
resources, the calculations of costs in this paper includes cash costs only.  There are 
3083 observations in the dataset, approximately 340 farms each year.  
 
Table 2.1:   Summary Statistics for all Specialist Dairy Farms in Ireland 
Year 1998 2001 2004 2006 
Herd Size (Cows) 38 44 45 50 
Farm Size (Ha) 38 43 44 47 
Farmer’s Age (Years) 47 47 49 51 
Yield Per Cow  (Litres) 4369 4880 4944 5028 
Stocking Rate (Cow per Forage 
Ha) 
1.89 1.93 1.91 1.91 
Family Farm Income (€’s) 24242 34426 34421 36221 
2.3.  Methodology 
A two step methodological approach is adopted to explore cost structures and to explain 
the large variation that exists in cost structures in Ireland. First the sector level cost 
structure is described and following this farm-level cost structures are examined.  
 
The sector level cost structure is described by developing annual cumulative cost curves. 
A cumulative cost curve provides an indication of the proportion of milk produced 
nationally at different prices, Colman and Zhuang (2005). Producers are ranked in 
ascending order of cost per litre of production and the cumulative amount or percentage 
of milk produced below any particular cost is calculated and plotted. Cumulative cost 
curves are derived for a number of years allowing us to determine whether total sectoral 
efficiency is increasing or decreasing. The cost curves can also be compared to those 
developed in other countries to provide some insight into international competitiveness.  
 
Farm level cost structures are explained by deriving cost functions and through cost 
mobility analysis. A cost function specifies the efficient use of resources, using the least 
cost combination of inputs to produce an output. The seminal paper by Burton (1995) 
developed a cost function for dairy farms in England. Colman and Zhuang (2005) used 
Burton’s specification to compute a cost function for the English and Welsh dairy-
farming sector for 1996 and 2003. Their analysis showed that all the explanatory 
variables were U shaped, meaning that costs of production decreased to a minimum 
point where economies of scale were achieved and that costs increased thereafter 
(diseconomies of scale). Their results showed that economies of scale were achieved in 
herd sizes up to 174 cows.  
 
The ad-hoc average cost function used by Colman and Zhuang (2005) is employed as 
the average cost function in this research as per equation 3.1.  
 
(ftAverageCos t  Herd Size, Herd Size², Concentrate Feed per cow, Concentrate per 
cow², Yield per cow, Yield per cow², Cow per Ha, Fair soil, Good soil and Farm size) 
         Equation 3.1 
 
 An ordinary least squares regression is implemented to determine which of the 
independent variables are statistically significant in affecting cost. The coefficients of the 
regression analysis are also used to plot economies of scale.  The average cost function 
should provide some insight into the factors affecting the variation in farm cost 
structures.  
 
Individual farmer’s cost management is also examined using a cost mobility analysis. 
The Center for International Studies and Co-operation (CECI) (2006) cites mobility of 
cost, or farmers’ ability to manage their own costs, as a major determinant of farm 
profitability. Techniques that have previously been applied to income mobility analysis 
are also appropriate for investigating the stickiness of costs. Phimister et al (2004) used 
survival analysis to examine the income mobility of Scottish farms. Here a similar 
methodology is employed to explore cost mobility.  
  
In the analysis farms are disaggregated into cost quintiles, as per Figure 1. Survival and 
hazard analysis are used to investigate the mobility between quintiles. Using the 
following procedure, time t is considered as the entry point for a farm into the survey 
(this may be in different years depending on when the farmer entered the survey), this 
farm is assigned to a quintile from 1(low costs) to 5 (high costs) in relation to all other 
farms. If j measures the duration (in years) of a particular farm in a quintile, a survival 
 and hazard  function can then be derived.  jS jh
 
The survival function measures the probability that the duration in a quintile lasts 
beyond year j, while the hazard function is the probability that a farm exits out of the 
quintile, i.e. the probability that the farm improves or disimproves costs relative to all 
other farms. A Weibull proportional hazard model is then used to test if there is a 
relationship between farm characteristics and the probability of improvement. To 
examine the link between farm characteristics and spells in high (low) costs a 
proportional hazard model is used, 
 
)exp()( 0 ijij xhxh   
where  is the baseline exit hazard and  is the vector of covariates assumed to 
influence the hazard (Phimister et al. 2004).  Using 1998 as the base year, each farm is 
examined to determine if they improved, regressed or stayed in the same cost quintile 
from year to year. The farm characteristics associated with cost improvement can then 
be identified.  
0jh ix
 
2.4. Results 
Table 2.2 provides a snapshot of all farms in the period. As shown total production costs 
have fluctuated over the period; increasing by 6 percent from 1998 to 2002, decreasing 
by 7 percent from 2002 to 2005 and increasing again by 14 percent from 2005 to 2006. 
The increase from 2005 to 2006 can be partly explained by an extremely dry summer. 
Gross output declined over the nine-year sample, with the exception of 2001. Net 
margin demonstrated an 11 percent nominal decrease in the first eight years, but fell 
sharply from 10.1 cpl in 2005 to 6.6 cpl in 2006, a 33 percent decrease.  
  
Table 2.2.         Average Production Costs, Margins and Output for all specialist 
dairy farms 1998-2006  
Cent per Litre (Nominal Terms)  
  
Gross 
Output  
Total Dairy 
Costs 
Dairy Net 
Margin  
1998 0.296 0.182 0.114 
1999 0.279 0.180 0.099 
2000 0.299 0.185 0.114 
2001 0.313 0.183 0.130 
2002 0.295 0.195 0.101 
2003 0.287 0.181 0.106 
2004 0.301 0.186 0.115 
2005 0.282 0.180 0.102 
2006 0.272 0.206 0.066 
 Source: National Farm Survey Data 
 The sector level cumulative cost curve of milk production for 2000, 2003 and 2006 are 
presented in Figure 2. As can be seen some efficiency gains were made from 2000 to 
2003, as the cumulative cost curve for 2003 is further to the left. In both 2000 and 2003 
over 50 percent of all milk was produced at 18 cent per litre or less. In 2006 however, 
only 30 percent of milk was produced at 18 cent per litre or less, indicating efficiency 
losses.  
 
 
Figure  2.2.         Cumulative Cost Curve for Irish Dairy Sector 
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The cumulative cost curves allow us to measure the cost efficiency of the sector as a 
whole; however they provide little information about individual farm cost efficiency. To 
explore costs structures at the farm level, cost functions were estimated. Table 2.3 
presents the results of the average cost function regressions on the 2003 and 2006 
data. The coefficients show the relationship between the independent variable and per 
unit cost. A negative coefficient suggests that costs decrease as this variable increases 
and the opposite is the case for those with a positive sign.  
 
Table 2.3.    Average Cost Function Results 2003 and 2006 
2003 2006 
 
Coefficient T value Coefficient T value 
Constant  0.4064416 13.19  .2952356  10.18 
Cows  2.40E-06 -0.81 -.0006823 -2.31 
Cows²  3.43E-06 1.83 3.43e-06 3.16 
Yield per cow  -0.0000949 -8.12 -.0000436 -4.36 
Yield per cow2  7.82E-09 6.66 2.98e-09 3.11 
Fair soil  -0.0046274 -1.17 -.0000271 -0.01 
Poor soil  -0.006079 -1.58 .0023193 0.51 
Cow per Ha  0.0026248 0.7 -.0307578 -3.91 
Farm size  0.0000754 0.68 .0001888 1.10 
Concentrates per Cow  0.0031692 6.93 .0038101 6.19 
Concentrates per cow2  -0.0000172 -2.33 -.0000281 -2.74 
                      
The results for the regression on the 2006 data are as expected; most of the variables 
are statistically significant, with the exception of farm size and soil quality, and all of the 
significant variables demonstrate the expected signs. For example, the effect of herd 
size is negative while herd size squared is positive. This suggests that costs of 
production decrease as herd size increases but only up to a certain point, i.e. the 
relationship is non-linear.  In other words, economies of scale are present. It is 
somewhat surprising that the results for 2003 suggest that herd size is not significant.  
 
Yield per cow is significant in both years and is negative and non-linear. This suggests 
that costs of production decrease as yield per cow increases but only up to a certain 
point and decrease thereafter. It is possible that the costs, in terms stocking rate and 
purchased feed, of pushing yields per cow beyond a certain limit are greater than the 
benefits achieved in the additional supply per cow.  The effect of the yield variable is 
also likely to be interlinked with the stocking rate and purchased feed variables. Figure 
2.3 presents the relationship between yield and production costs graphically. The graph 
shows the optimal yield per cow to be somewhere around 6,000 litres per cow.  
 
 
 Figure 2.3 : The Relationship between Production Costs and Yield per Cow 
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Soil quality and farm size have no significant effect on average cost in either 2003 or 
2006. Farm size is a measure of total land area and as such there may be 
multicollinearity problems between herd size and stocking density, thus making this 
variable not significant. The non-significance of soil quality may be explained by the 
relatively little variability in this variable, as the vast majority of farms are on good soils.   
 
The average cost curve (ACC) for the dairy sector in 2006 was subsequently plotted 
from the results of the average cost function. The 2003 data was not plotted due to the 
non significance of many of the variables. Calculating the ACC involves plotting equation 
1 by using the coefficients obtained from the regression and multiplying them by their 
respective average from the sample. The average cost curve is presented in Figure 3.4. 
The results show that economies of scale exist up to about 99 cows and diseconomies of 
scale set in thereafter. Interestingly costs increase dramatically faster as size increases 
over 160 cows. Labour costs become an issue as the dairy farms expand and this could 
explain this rise in cost. Given the constraints of milk quota, obtaining an optimal herd of 
99 cows remains a challenge; the average herd size in Ireland was 55 cows in 2006.  
 
 
Figure  2.4.  Average Cost Curve 2006 
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Comparing the Irish average cost curve with that produced by Colman and Zhuang 
(2005), the optimum herd size in 2003 in England and Wales was 174 cows. The slope 
of Colman and Zhuang’s average reduces much faster as herd size increases up to the 
optimum point. This implies that farms in England and Wales are attaining economies of 
scale quicker than Ireland as herd size increases. 
  
2.4.1 Survival and Hazard Model and Cost Mobility 
A panel of farmers who remained in the sample for the nine-year period was compiled 
for a transition matrix, totalling 114 sample farms. All farms in the sample were used in 
the survival analysis not only those that stayed in the sample for all nine years. A cost 
quintile analysis was conducted and a transition matrix derived to measure the 
movement of farms between cost quintiles from 1998 to 2006.  The results in Table 3.4 
show that over 40 percent of those in the lowest total cost quintile in 1998 are still in 
lowest cost quintile in 2006, while inversely for those who had the highest costs in 1998 
over half of them were still in that quintile in 2006. Only 7 percent of those in the high 
cost quintile in 1998 were in the low cost quintile in 2006. This suggests that there is 
limited mobility in cost structure and the majority of the movement that occurs is to the 
closest quintile.  
 
  
Table  2.4:  Transition matrix of cost mobility for 1998 and 2006 quintiles 
 
  
1998 Quintiles 
  
  
    
  1 2 3 4 5 Total 
1 41% 30% 11% 11% 7% 100% 
2 48% 26% 13% 9% 4% 100% 
3 22% 17% 39% 13% 9% 100% 
4 12% 16% 32% 28% 12% 100% 
  
  
  
2006 
Quintiles  
  
  5 0% 13% 23% 17% 47% 100% 
 
Survival analysis is used to calculate the probability that a farm can move through the 
cost quintiles.  Table 2.5 illustrates the results of the survival analysis for the sample. It 
shows the probability of farms improving their cost structure.  
   
Table 2.5.  Survival Analysis 1998-2006 
Year Probability of 
Improvement 
1998  0.2390 
1999  0.2814 
2000  0.2580 
2001  0.2871 
2002  0.2805 
2003  0.2816 
2004  0.3438 
2005  0.2547 
2006  0.2736 
 
The results show that the probability of improving cost structure has increased 
marginally over the period. While this information is useful, the hazard model can be 
used to identify the characteristics of those farms that are improving cost structure.  The 
following results were attained from the Weilbull proportional model.  
 
Table 2.6.  Results of Weilbull Proportional Hazard Model  
  Hazard T-stat 
Herd Size         .9966749 -1.99 
Farm Size  1.003988 2.42 
Cow per Ha      1.049021 0.80 
Concentrates .9858114 -3.72 
Yield per Cow .9999817 -0.53 
Good Soil         1.125795 1.83 
Fair Soil           1.285962 3.47 
 
 
The hazard ratios identify the factors significantly affecting a farmer’s probability of 
improving cost structure. Those with fair soil and good soil are 28 percent and 12 
percent respectively more likely than those with poor soil to improve cost structure. This 
result suggest that farming on poor soil, although the number of dairy farms in this 
category are quite low, is a significant disadvantage and limits the farmer’s ability to 
improve costs. Increasing farm size also improves the probability that a farm will 
improve cost structure, while the effect of stocking rate and yield per cow are not 
statistically significant. Increasing herd size and concentrates will decrease the 
probability of improving cost structure by approximately 1 percent. 
  
2.5. Conclusions  
The purpose of this paper is to analysis the cost efficiency of Irish dairy farms with a 
view to explaining why such large differences exist in cost structure. Various 
methodologies were employed to determine the factors driving costs as well as the 
characteristics of those farms that succeeded in maintaining low costs. Employing an 
average cost function like Colman and Zhuang (2005), it was determined from 2006 
data that the optimal herd size was 99 cows, compared to the current average of 55 
thus there is ample capacity to exploit economies of scale. While economies of scale 
may be exploited, the presence of the milk quota regime continues to act as a major 
barrier to expansion. The results suggest that if milk quotas were removed or enlarged, 
as is likely over the next few years, Ireland would be well placed to increase production 
while maintaining cost efficiency. Increasing yield per cow and stocking rate also 
decrease costs implying that scale and improving efficiency is key to reducing cost.  
 
While significant variation in costs exist across farms, the cost mobility analysis showed 
that, relative to their peers, individual farmer’s cost efficiency changed very little over 
the period. Using a cost quintile analysis and a transition matrix, the results showed that 
the majority farmers stay in the same cost quintile or only move to the nearest quintile.  
This suggests that high cost farmers tend to remain high cost. A hazard model was used 
to identify the characteristics of farmers that improve their cost efficiency over time. The 
results yielded limited information on the drivers of cost efficiency, with farm size and 
soil type being the main drivers of change.  The analysis revealed that physical 
endowments like soil type have a significant negative impact on the probability on 
improving cost structure, suggesting that even increased scale and technical efficiency 
cannot compensate for this disadvantage.  
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3.1. Introduction 
Milk quota system was first introduced in the EU dairy sector in 1984 in bid to curb milk 
over-production and hence to put a cap on spending of EU budget on dairy subsidies. 
Under the milk quota system, each member state was allocated a quota limit based on 
their historical annual milk production level. This allocated national quota covers total 
milk production in a quota year, starting on 1 April and ending on 31 March. The quota 
levels for the EU-15 states for the year 2005/06 are shown in Figure 3.1. European 
countries which entered the EU afterwards were allocated with milk quota based on 
their respective historical annual production levels.  
 
Figure 3.1. Milk quota levels for the EU-15 member states (20005/06)  
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Source: EU Commission, 2006 
 
Under the quota system, each member state is allowed to produce milk within its 
allocated quota level in a given quota year. A super levy, 115% of the EU target price 
for milk for that year, was implemented for the states that exceed the allocated quota 
and was payable on the over produced quantity. The country paying super levy imposes 
it on producers, who have exceeded their respective individual quota (which are also 
based on historical production levels). During the early years of quota introduction, 
quota trade was not allowed within a member state hence farmers had to produce 
within their quota limit or pay super levy. This restricted farmers’ options on deciding to 
exit or expand milk production such that, on one hand, removed an opportunity from 
non-profit making farms to sell quota and exit farming, while on the other hand, the 
efficient farmers were not allowed with an opportunity to expand their production level 
by buying milk quota. This was however, changed in 1986/87 when the member states 
were allowed to trade milk quota trade within the state. It aimed to increase efficiency 
in milk production as efficient milk producers can now acquire additional quota level by 
purchasing or leasing quota from less efficient farmers and hence increase production 
without having to pay a super levy. There are a number of quota trade systems within 
different EU member states which are described in the following. 
 
3.2. Quota trades in the EU states 
At the time when quota trade was introduced, member states were allowed to adopt 
trade mechanisms that suit them better which resulted in different types of trade 
mechanism in different EU states. The quota trades in different member states differs 
from each other as some states introduced obligatory attachment of land (France, 
Spain) and some not (Germany, Ireland); some regulated quota trade by a central 
administration (Ireland, Denmark) while others allowed trade at regional auctioneers 
(UK, Germany). However, the major difference between quota trades in the member 
states was the restrictions implemented on area of trade. There was a wide range of 
area of trade in different member states. Based on the area of trade restrictions, quota 
trades in the EU can be categorized into four different levels (Figure 3.2). The first 
category is when no quota trade is allowed. It happened in all EU states from 1984 to 
1987 when farmers were not allowed to sell or buy milk quota. However, since 1987 
when quota trade was allowed, member states had adopted the rest of three categories. 
 
 
Figure 3.2. Quota trade mechanisms in the EU 
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3.2.1. Ring fenced to milk processors 
This form of quota trade is based on the fact that all dairy farmers have a contract with 
a local milk processor. The milk quota trade in this mechanism is restricted around those 
milk processors. In this case, a farmer can trade milk quota with a farmer with same 
milk processor. That means milk production cannot go out of a particular processor. 
Ireland operates milk trade under this mechanism. Italy is another state which uses this 
mechanism however, there is a relaxation in the mechanism where farmers from other 
processor (co-operatives) can purchase quota if it is still available after 30 days period.  
 
Ireland 
Milk quota trade in Ireland started as early as 1987 through leasing and selling of milk 
quota. The quota transfer was ring fenced within co-operatives and quota price were set 
by the Department of Food and Agriculture. Since the start of 2007, a new quota 
exchange programme has been introduced where quota trading is still ring fenced to 
cooperatives but quota price is based on farmers’ bids. Under the new exchange system, 
on the sale side, farmers can offer as much quota as they like with a restriction of 30% 
of total quantity offered for sale is transferred to a priority pool. Farmers in the priority 
category (young farmers, new entrants, successors etc) can bid for this priority pool at a 
maximum price of 12 cpl. This price is set by the DAF. On the demand side, a farmer is 
allowed to bid for a maximum of 60,000 l of quota. An initial equilibrium price was 
calculated once all bids were finalised. All purchase bids that exceed 40% of this initial 
equilibrium price were then removed and second equilibrium price which is the market 
clearing price was calculated. This is done for each co-operative participating in the 
quota transfer hence each co-operative will have its own market clearing price. The 
transfer of quota within each co-operative would then take place at this market clearing 
price.  
 
3.2.2. Regionalised quota trade 
The trade is restricted at a regional base in this type of mechanism. The EU states like 
Germany and France adopted this mechanism for milk quota trade in the country. This 
mechanism is more flexible than ring fence mechanism as farmers can trade between 
co-operatives within a region and have more options to place their bids. The mechanism 
in Germany is described below. 
 
Germany 
Quota trade in Germany started in 1990/91 when farmers were allowed to lease in milk 
quota. Milk quota transfer was linked with land transfer at that time which was changed 
in following year when quota can be leased out without land. Since 2000, milk quota 
transfer is based on a regionalised auction system. The milk transfer is restricted to 21 
trading zones based on NUTS I and II levels. This transfer takes place three times a 
year. The buyers bidding at the suction should be active dairy producers and have to 
pay a fee to participate in the auction. A small part of the transferred milk quotas are 
transferred to the national reserve which can be reallocated to the young/hardship 
programmes. The milk quota price is calculated for each regional auction and depends 
on bided quantity and the respective equilibrium price. The equilibrium price is 
calculated in several steps. First, each quantity offered and the referring price are listed, 
starting with the lowest price. Second, all demands with reference quantity and price are 
listed, starting with the highest price. Third, the sum, starting with the offered quantity 
with the highest price and the demanded quantity with the lowest price, is built up. 
Subsequently, the price with the lowest difference between offered and demanded 
quantity is established. Then, the offers with a 40 % higher price than the calculated 
price are removed to calculate a new equilibrium price (Figure 3.3). This scheme will not 
be used if the first price calculation leads to a price below 30 ct/kg quota. The 
equilibrium price must now satisfy the condition that the demanded quantities to be 
transferred are at least equal to the offered quantities. If this is not the case, the price is 
corrected downwards stepwise (in one cent increments per kg).  
 
 
Figure 3.3. Supply and demand curve in a German auction 
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3.2.3. National quota trade  
There is no spatial restriction within a state in this type of transfer mechanism. Farmers 
can bid to sell and buy milk quota from farms any where in the country. This mechanism 
is most flexible where milk quota is not restricted to any area. It may lead to a high 
concentration of milk production in the most profitable area of the country. The EU 
states such as Denmark, the UK and the Netherlands adopted this mechanism. A brief 
description of quota trade in Denmark is provided below. 
 
Denmark 
Denmark started a milk quota exchange programme in 1997. The Danish Milk Board 
administers and registers all kinds of allocation and transfer of quota. The Milk Board 
runs 4 quota exchanges a year. Quota is transferred to the purchaser within two months 
of trade. As of the November 2001 exchange a 1% deduction scheme was introduced, 
implying that 1% is deducted from sold quota and transferred to the ‘free quantities’, to 
be used for allocation of free quantities to new establishments (50% given free of 
costs). All producers are entitled to place one bid for purchase or sale of quota at the 
exchange. Any producer, wanting to sell quota, makes an offer to sell stating quantity 
and minimum price and any producer, wanting to buy quota, makes an offer, stating 
quantity and maximum price.  
 
 Figure 3.4. supply and demand curves in Danish Milk quota exchange 
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There is no restriction on quantity to purchase so a producer may bid to purchase as 
much quota as he requires. All individual bids are adjusted to an average fat content of 
4.36% to arrive at a market clearing price of the quota exchange. All bids are recorded 
in a supply and a demand curve and an equilibrium price or the market clearing price is 
determined at the cut-off point between the two curves (Figure 3.4). Producers, who 
would sell at a price lower or equal to the market clearing price, will sell.  And 
producers, who would buy at a price higher or equal to the market clearing price, will 
buy. Remaining offers are rejected. Producers, who have been rejected on account of 
either a too low purchase bid or a too high sales bid, will have to try again at the 
following quota exchange.  
 
3.2.4.  A cross border quota trade 
A fourth category of quota trade can be perceived as a cross border trade. This category 
does not exist at the moment but can be assumed as a possible measure to be 
implemented in preparation of quota removal in the EU by 2015. When the quota trade 
was introduced within a member states, it aimed at increasing production efficiency of 
dairy farms. This trade under went further changes within several member states to 
increase production efficiency.  For instance, quota trade in the UK started as a ring 
fenced trade but quota is allowed to trade nationally since 1994 (NDC, 1996). If we look 
at the trend of milk quota transfer in the EU states, coupled by recent reforms of the 
CAP, a movement towards a free quota trade can be established as shown in Figure 3.2. 
Although, quota trade within a state allows quota production balance within a country 
and increases production efficiency but an imbalance of milk production between the 
member states still exists. Some member states continuously produced milk below 
national quota limit whereas other kept on over producing and pay super levy.  
 
The figures of over production and under production in some of the member states and 
super levy paid by the over producing states for year 2004/5 are shown in Figure 3.5. 
The over-production countries such as Germany and Italy had around 400 milk l of over 
production and paid around € 136 mil on super levy while many countries such as 
France and the UK did not use all of their national quota level. A cross border quota 
trade would effectively reduce this imbalance in production between member states. 
Hence we presumed that the last category of quota trade will be a cross border trade. 
This is a proposed trade mechanism where farmers from different member states can 
sell or buy quota to one another. This trade will help in balancing production in different 
member states as the under producing states would be able to sell their quota to over 
producing states. 
 
  
Figure 3.5. Milk production in excess or deficit in 2004/05 in the EU-15 states 
[Figures on top of each bar is the levy paid in 2005 in € million].  
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3.3. Discussion and Conclusions 
Milk quota trade in the EU states ranges from a very restrictive ring-fence system to a 
free national system. Ring fencing is especially a good mechanism to restrict milk 
production in a desired area. This mechanism allows a more uniform distribution of milk 
production in a country. However, farmers bidding to sale or expand production have a 
limited market to do so and efficient producers are restricted over the amount of 
available quota if they wish to increase their production. Hence this mechanism favours 
‘equity’ among dairy farmers but fails to promote ‘efficiency’ in milk production. The 
regional milk trade mechanism has a wider market than ring fence mechanism but is still 
restrictive to certain regions. It provides opportunity to efficient farmers to expand 
within regional quota availability. Although milk production at the farm level might 
change, this mechanism still keeps total milk production constant within a regional. The 
free national market provides a wider opportunity for a farmer for selling or buying milk 
quota. Farmers in the countries implementing this mechanism have access to the 
national quota market and hence can make decision more effectively to expand or exist 
dairy farming. This mechanism tends to move milk quota towards efficient regions and 
create a specialized milk producing regions within a country. For instance, since the 
Netherlands opted for a national trade mechanism, a movement of quota from south to 
north-east regions created a specialized milk producing area especially around 
Gelderland (Bailey, 2002). 
 
The last mechanism ie., the cross border trade  is as stated earlier, one of the possible 
routes envisaged by the EU for the ‘soft landing’ of milk quota abolition. This would 
allow the member states who are producing milk over quota limit to buy quota from 
under-producing members’. In another words milk quota would not remain limiting for 
those high producing states and the impact of milk quota abolishment would not be 
large compared to when quota is limiting. 
 
In Ireland, milk quota transfer is still carried out to date within ring fenced areas. It has 
been successful in keeping milk production spread over the country. The geographical 
distribution of milk production in the country suggests that large efficient dairy farms are 
concentrated to the southern part while small dairy farms are more prominent in the 
north-western part of the country (Hennessy and Shrestha, 2007). The national quota 
exchanges showed that there is more demand for milk from the south part of the 
country. The country may move to regional or national quota trade mechanism which 
would allow these efficient farms to produce more milk. However, the downside of that 
move would be the loss of small farms in the north-western part. Studies showed that 
although the farms are smaller in these regions, the dependability of agriculture is 
higher there compared to other regions (Hennessy et al., 2007). Hence, any move to 
change quota trade in Ireland should be made cautiously.   
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4.1. Introduction  
Dairy production in the EU is constrained by production quotas. Milk quota transfers 
between farmers have been allowed since the early 1980s, although to varying degrees 
in different Member States. In some Member States quota is traded freely in an auction 
system, while in others trade is regionalised or “ring-fenced”, for example Ireland, 
Germany, parts of Scotland and France. The motivations behind the ring-fencing of milk 
quota mostly relate to social, rural development and local policy goals. While ring-
fencing may be successful in meeting these objectives, it has implications for the 
efficiency of the milk producing sector as a whole.  
 
This paper aims to quantify the efficiency implications of regionalising quota trade. A 
simulation model of quota trade is developed using farm data for Ireland. The model is 
employed to estimate the optimal allocation of milk quota in a perfectly functioning 
quota trade market where quota can be traded nationally and subsequently in a scenario 
where the trade of quota is ring-fenced. The novel component of this research is that 
national aggregation factors facilitate the derivation of cumulative cost curves of 
production for the Irish dairy farm sector as a whole, thereby enabling a comparison of 
sector-wide efficiency under the two forms of quota trade.  
 
The paper also attempts to quantify the inefficiencies arising from policy uncertainty in 
relation to the future of the EU milk quota regime. The model is simulated for a number 
of milk quota reform scenarios and the implications of an early abolition of the EU milk 
quota for quota trade prices are quantified and the consequent effects of this 
inefficiency are discussed. While the data used in this paper are specific to Ireland, the 
methodology developed is sufficiently general to be applied to other FADN datasets to 
estimate the inefficiencies of regionalised quota trade. Using the EU wide FADN dataset 
the methodology could also be used to estimate the potential efficiency gains that could 
be achieved if milk quotas in the EU were permitted to trade across international 
borders.  
 
4.2. Background 
There has been much written on the effect of the EU milk quota system on efficiency 
and the impact on assets values; see for example Harvey (1983), Burrell (1987) and 
Dawson (1991). These papers, and many others, tend to support the general theory put 
forward by Alston (1981) and Oskam et al (1992); that the imposition of a quota 
generates an economic inefficiency in the sector but that the more freely traded quotas 
are, the smaller that inefficiency. The reasoning being that if quotas are tradable, more 
efficient farmers will purchase quota from the less efficient and the national quota will 
be produced at a lower cost.  
 
A number of empirical studies have attempted to quantify the relationship between 
quota trade and sector efficiency. Boots et al (1996) used a simulation model to quantify 
the short-term effects of quota trade distortion for a panel of specialist Dutch dairy 
farms. They concluded that liberal quota trade increases farm profit and leads to a 
geographical concentration of production. They did not however, draw any conclusions 
about sector-wide efficiency. In a number of studies on UK dairy farming, Colman 
(2000) and Colman et al (2002) developed models to estimate the optimal allocation of 
milk quota in the UK. The results showed that substantially more redistribution of quota 
was required for the UK dairy farm structure to reach its optimal position. Another 
relevant study is that of Alvarez et al (2006). They estimated quota values for a sample 
of Spanish dairy farms and then decomposed those values according to efficiency, size 
and input price effects. Their results revealed that efficiency was the most important 
factor in explaining the variation in quota values.  They concluded that given the 
difficulty in observing farm efficiency, any government intervention in quota markets is 
likely to be misguided and therefore the more liberal the trade of quota the more 
efficient the outcome.   
Regionalised quota trade has been in operation in Ireland since January 2007 under an 
exchange system where farmers can bid to purchase or sell quota at their desired price. 
Quota is then traded at the market equilibrium price, albeit with some intervention and 
market cooling mechanisms.2 In 2007, purchasers were allowed a maximum allocation 
of 80,000 litres per exchange. Each dairy processor operates an exchange and quotas 
are ring-fenced so that they can not be moved from one exchange to another. This ring-
fencing mechanism, therefore, ensures security of supply for dairy processors it does 
also however, afford the processors considerable market power.3 There are over 20 
separate exchanges, with prices in the second 2007 exchange varying from 12 cent to 
45 cent per litre.  In this paper the economic implications of this quota trade system are 
explored.  
 
While a number of studies have addressed the inefficiencies of quota trade, relatively 
few have explored the inefficiencies of policy uncertainty and the implications for 
sectoral efficiency. Colman (2000) discusses this issue. He highlights how decisions 
taken by some dairy farmers in the early years of the quota regime, on the basis of a 
finite expected life, subsequently turned out to be sub-optimal when the life of the 
quota was extended. The opposite problem, however, is likely to be the case in the 
coming years. The 2003 Mid Term Review of the CAP extended the life of the milk quota 
regime to 2015. However, the CAP Health Check in 2008 has suggested that quotas may 
be abolished earlier than that date or may be phased out before that date by a process 
of gradual quota expansion. If quotas become ineffective before 2015, it is likely that 
farmers will have over paid for quota in the belief that it would remain binding until 
                                                 
2 Full information on the milk quota exchange scheme is available from www.agriculture.gov.ie.  
3 In theory allowing processors control over the allocation of quota may give them the opportunity to 
manipulate the prices paid to farmers without the risk of losing supply. In reality however, all of these 
processors are operated by a co-operative board comprising farmer members and there is very little 
difference in the milk prices paid across processors.  
2015, resulting in further efficiency losses for the sector. This paper attempts to quantify 
the cost of this policy uncertainty.  
 
The ensuing section of the paper presents the theoretical model underlying the empirical 
analysis following this, the specification of the empirical model is outlined and then 
results of the analysis are presented.  
 
4.3. Theoretical Model 
Employing a discrete time specification, the objective function of an individual farmer, 
denoted by subscript i, is expressed as: 
   0
1 ( ) . ( )
1it
T
i it t ittQ t i
itMax M P Q C Qr        (1) 
 
Here the farmer chooses a quantity  of quota to purchase in each period (year) that 
maximises a discounted stream of annual cashflows between the current period 
itQ
0t   
and the period when quota is abolished, t T .  The first component in the square 
brackets represents the farm’s cash margin from milk deliveries according to its milk 
quota ( itM ) in period t
4.  The second component ( ) is the investment in quota the 
farmer makes in period t which is simply the price of quota in that period ( ) times the 
quantity of quota purchased ( ).  The final component in equation (
.t itP Q
tP
itQ 1) represents 
adjustment costs to the farmer associated with expansion of milk production by amount 
.  Adjustment costs include for example, additional housing, land, labour, etc, these 
are explained in detail in the next section.  It should be noted that in a regionalised 
quota market the variables in equation 1 will also have a region subscript.   
itQ
 
Since it is assumed that milk deliveries itM  are exactly equal to the farm’s milk quota in 
period t, then: 
 1it it itM M Q          (2) 
                                                 
4 To avoid notational clutter the profit function displays only milk quota (Mit) in its argument.  It also 
comprises a vector of other factor inputs as well as cost and revenue coefficients. 
Thus milk deliveries in period t are equal to milk deliveries in period  plus quota 
purchased in period t. Equation (
1t 
2) therefore defines the quota constraint that limits the 
farmer’s optimisation problem. The Lagrangian for farm i’s maximisation problem is: 
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Here it  is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the constraint that relates itM  to 
.  It represents the marginal value to farmer i from relaxing the milk production 
constraint by one unit.  This is simply the shadow price of milk quota and it specifies the 
marginal effect of an increase in 
1itM 
itM on the value of the farm’s discounted cash flows 
between and t  discounted to time 0.   0t  T
To simplify the algebra define: 
  1 tit i itr           (4) 
Here t  is the value to the farmer of an additional unit of quota at time t and in time t 
(i.e. undiscounted) values. 
The Lagrangian can now be rewritten as: 
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The first order condition for the farm’s investment in milk quota in period t is therefore: 
  
1:     ( ) 0
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     (6) 
which is equivalent to: 
( )t itP C Q           (7) 
The left hand side of this expression is the price of milk quota plus the marginal 
adjustment cost.  Therefore, equation (7) states that the farm invests in milk quota until 
the point where the cost of acquiring (and utilising) additional milk quota equals the 
marginal value product (shadow price) of the quota. 
 
Next consider the first order condition for the farm’s milk quota constraint ( itM ) in 
period t.  The first order condition for itM  is:: 
 
 11
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Multiplying by  and rearranging yields 1(1 )tir

 1(1 ) ( ) (1 )i it i it itr M r             (9) 
 
Defining 1it it it      equation (9) can be written as: 
 
1( ) (
1it i it iti
M r
r
)             (10) 
In this equation the left hand side is the marginal revenue product of milk quota while 
the right hand side is the opportunity cost of a unit of milk quota.  Owning a unit of milk 
quota for a time period requires forgoing  i itr  of real interest since the discount rate  
represents farm i’s opportunity cost of capital.  In addition, there are offsetting capital 
value losses 
ir
it  as the price of quota falls as time approaches the period when quota 
is abolished.   
 
This paper employs an empirical specification of the constrained optimisation problem 
defined by equations (1) and (2).  Using estimates of farm level adjustment costs and 
projected milk prices, estimates of the marginal revenue product (economic value) of 
milk quota, ( it )M  , are derived for a sample of dairy farms for the period up to 2015.  
In turn, using equation (7) the analysis estimates optimal volumes ( ) of quota that 
individual farms are projected to demand (or supply) at alternative levels of milk quota 
price.  Aggregation of these results enables the empirical estimation of demand and 
supply schedules for milk quota. 
itQ
 
4.4. Empirical Strategy 
The theoretical model is made operational with a farm-level optimisation model. It is 
assumed that farmers behave to maximise profit subject to physical, financial and policy 
related constraints. The model is a multi-period optimisation model solving in EXCEL. It 
is assumed that milk quotas remain binding until 2015 and the time horizon of the 
optimisation problem specified in equation 1 covers a 9 year period between 2007 
( ) and 2015 ( ).  When the model is optimised the economic (shadow) value of 
an additional unit of quota is estimated. To simplify the empirical analysis we assume 
that farms that invest in quota only do so in the first time period (t = 0).  Thus we can 
drop the t subscript from the Q
0t  t T
it. Under the milk quota exchange system in operation in 
Ireland purchases, in any given period, are limited to 80,000 litres per farm, hence Qi ≤ 
80,000.  
 
The economic value of quota is estimated as the sum of the discounted stream of 
annual cashflows between the current period 0t   and the period when quota is 
abolished, .  Data on gross output and costs are taken from the 2006 NFS for each 
farmer  and projected for each year t using FAPRI-Ireland projections (Binfield et 
al 2007). All technical coefficients, as recorded by the NFS, are assumed to remain static 
over the period. Profit from milk production 
t T
1..i n
 ( itM )  is equal to gross output less 
variable and overhead costs. The discounted sum of future cashflows relating to owned 
quota are used to estimate the price at which farmers would be willing to sell quota. The 
demand price of quota is equal to the sum of future cashflows less adjustment costs, 
the cost of producing the additional milk.  
 
The adjustment costs  associated with purchase of  units of milk quota differ 
depending on the stage of expansion.  In this analysis adjustment costs are modelled as 
a piece-wise function where it is assumed that farmers can expand milk production 
through two stages, X and Y.  This structure is illustrated in Figure 4.1.  The marginal 
adjustment costs per litre associated with each stage of expansion and the extent to 
which each stage is feasible varies by farm depending on existing resources and 
efficiency.  The adjustment costs associated with farm i’s investment in Q
( itC Q ) itQ
i quota can be 
written as: 
 
C(Qi) =  
( )                                          if  
( ) ( )                   if 
ix i i i
ix i iy i i i i
C Q Q X
C X C Q X Q X

      (11) 
 
With  ix iyC C
 
The marginal adjustment cost for farm i is Cix in the first stage (Stage X) and Ciy in the 
second expansion stage (Stage Y).  The first range of expansion (X) involves enterprise 
substitution (typically substitution of dairy cows for beef cattle).  The costs associated 
with this stage of expansion include foregone profit from the beef enterprise, addtional 
heifer replacement costs and modest infrastructural costs.  
 
Figure 4.1.  The Structure of Adjustment Costs in the Analysis 
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The second stage of expansion (Y) occurs after investment in additional quota exceeds 
the threshold Xi.  This point is determined by the farm’s resource endowment and 
reprsents the maximum expansion of the farm’s dairy enterprise that can be achieved 
through enterprise substitution.  After point Xi, further expansion (Stage Y) requires 
more substantial investment in terms of acquiring additional land and the construction of 
new infrastructure. Consequently, marginal adjustment costs in stage Y are considerably 
higher than in Stage X.  In the empirical analysis, the costs associated with each stage 
of expansion are taken from Shalloo et al (2006). The full details of costs associated 
with each stage of expansion are outlined in Appendix 1.  
 
Once the expansion costs have been calculated the economic value associated with Qi 
can be estimated for each farmer i. If Xi < 80,000 litres then a farmer will have two 
economic values one associated with stage X and another with stage Y, where Xi≥ 
80,000 only one economic value applies. By applying the aggregation factors from the 
NFS dataset to the economic sale and purchase values it is possible to aggregate the 
total amount of quota that would be purchased or sold at various prices, allowing us to 
derive aggregate demand and supply schedules.   
 
4.4.1. Scenarios Modelled 
Two types of scenarios are modelled; the first pertains to quota trade and the second to 
EU milk quota policy. Quota trade is simulated in a national trade scenario and a 
regional scenario. Four regions are modelled; the Border Midlands and West as one 
region (BMW), the South West (SW), the South (S) and the East (E). For the national 
trade scenario all observations are pooled regardless of their geographic location. 
 
Two EU milk quota policy scenarios are modelled; a baseline scenario assuming the 
current EU milk quota remains binding until 2015 and a quota reform scenario. In 2007 
the FAPRI-Ireland Partnership conducted analysis of a milk quota reform scenario. The 
scenario assumes that the EU milk quota is gradually expanded by 3 percent each year 
from 2008 to 2015. The price and cost projections produced by the FAPRI-Ireland study, 
Binfield et al (2007), are used here to investigate the impact of milk quota expansion on 
the economic value for quota and the efficiency of the sector.  
 
4.4.2. Data 
The farm dataset consists of 343 farms that are weighted to represent approximately 
20,000 dairy farms (Connolly et al 2006). Costs of production, and as a consequence 
profit, differ considerably across the sample. Figure 4.2 disaggregates the sample on the 
basis of cost efficiency. In 2006 the national average cost of production was 
approximately 20 cent per litre (CPL) but costs varied from 25 CPL on high cost farms to 
16 CPL on low cost farms.   
 
 
 
Figure 4. 2: Variation in Total Costs of Milk Production across all Creamery 
Milk Producers in Ireland in 2006 
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Source: National Farm Survey (2006)  
 
To investigate the implications of regionalising quota trade, four regional quota markets 
are simulated. Table 4.1 presents some summary statistics for the four regions. On a 
gross margin basis, the East region has the highest profitability, with a gross margin of 
17.3 CPL, however when overhead costs are factored in and net margin is considered 
the SW it the most profitable region with an average net margin of 7.4 CPL. The East 
has the largest expansion capacity on existing resources with the average farm having 
capacity for 24 additional cows.  
 
Table 4.1: Regional Variability – Summary Statistics for four regions modelled 
Summary Statistics BMW 
N=65 
SW 
N=76 
East 
N=80 
South 
N=122 
Percentage of Farms (%) 25 30 14 31 
Percentage of national quota (%) 21 30 15 34 
Total Quota (millions of litres) 906 1234 651 1430 
Average quota size (litres) 210,000 200,000 255,000 258,000 
Average yield per cow (litres) 4,800 4,300 4,600 4,800 
Average gross margin per litre 
(€) 
0.169 0.166 0.173 0.156 
Average net margin per litre (€) 0.062 0.074 0.068 0.061 
Expansion capacity cow numbers 11 15 24 16 
Source: National Farm Survey (2006)  
 
Figure 4.3 presents the milk price projections under the baseline and the milk quota 
expansion scenario. It is estimated that under both scenarios milk prices will fall from 
the peak experienced in 2007. As expected, the price falls faster under the milk quota 
expansion scenario as supply increases across the EU. It is estimated that by 2014 milk 
supply in Ireland will have increased by 21 percent compared to the baseline and as a 
result milk price would be 8 percent lower.  
 
 
Figure 4.3: Irish Farm-Level Milk Price Projections Baseline and Milk Quota 
Expansion Scenario 
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Source: Binfield et al (2007). 
 
 
4.5. Results 
Figure 4.4 presents milk quota supply and demand curves in 2008 for the four regional 
quota markets. The results show the equilibrium quota trade price in the BMW region is 
approximately 21CPL compared to a price of 26 CPL in the East. The markets in the 
South West and South are much larger and the equilibrium prices are higher. The 
equilibrium price in the SW region is the highest at 35 CPL and the trade price in the 
South is 29 CPL.    
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.4: Regional Milk Quota Market – Trade in Millions of Litres 
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Figure 4.5 presents the equilibrium trade price when quota is traded nationally. The 
results show that the equilibrium trade price is 30 CPL and approximately 650m litres of 
milk are traded.  
 
Figure 4.5: National Milk Quota Market 
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It can be inferred that if Ireland shifted to national milk quota trade, quota would move 
out of the BMW and East regions and into the South West in particular. The farm-level 
model can be used to ascertain the implications for farm numbers and the location of 
production if quota was traded nationally. In the profit maximising model all farmers 
with a milk quota value below the equilibrium price would sell quota while all those with 
values greater than the equilibrium would find it profitable to purchase milk quota. Using 
this model it is possible to estimate changes in farm numbers and quota movement as a 
consequence of moving from a regional quota market to a national quota market. Table 
4.2 shows projections of farm numbers under the two quota trade scenarios. Farm 
numbers fall faster, by 2.5 percent more, when quota is traded nationally rather than 
regionally and farm numbers decline more in the BMW and East regions and less in the 
South West. There is almost no change in the South.  
 
Table 4.2: The Implications of a National Milk Quota Market for Farm 
Numbers 
Weighted  
Farm 
Numbers  
2006  
Base 
Regional 
Exchange 
National 
Exchange
Change 
Regional to 
National (%) 
Nationally 19,600 15,739 15,353 -2.5 
BMW 4,890 4,332 3,845 -12 
SW 5,961 4,770 5,238 +10 
East 2,769 2,349 1,998 -15 
South 5,948 4,342 4,271 -1 
 
 
Previous research suggests that more liberal trade of milk quota leads to more efficient 
outcomes. Here this hypothesis is tested empirically by comparing the cumulative cost 
curves for the sector under regional and national trade. Drawing on work conducted by 
Colman and Zhuang (2006) farm survey data is used to rank producers in ascending 
order of cost per litre of production and the cumulative amount of milk produced below 
any particular cost is calculated and plotted. Figure 4.6 presents the cumulative cost 
function for the Irish dairy farming sector under national and regional quota markets. 
The cumulative cost functions include the total costs of production, direct plus overhead 
costs as well as quota purchase costs in 2008 which are discounted over the seven year 
period to quota abolition in 2015.  
 
 
Figure 4.6: Cumulative Cost of Irish Milk Production Cent per Litre – 2006 and 
quota trade scenarios 
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The cost curves are very similar but as is evident production is at a slightly lower cost 
under national trade. For example, for a total cost of production of 25 cent per litre 93 
percent of milk is produced under national trade compared to 89 percent under regional 
trade. The total cost of producing the national milk supply can be estimated for the two 
scenarios. Under national trade the milk supply would be produced for €817.5 million 
while the cost under the regional scenario is €837.5 million, approximately €20 million or 
2.5 percent higher. It follows then that the practice of ring-fencing quota trade to 
particular regions introduces an inefficiency of approximately €20million.  
 
4.5.1. Implications of Policy Uncertainty 
This section of the paper explores the effect of an expansion in the EU milk quota on the 
economic value of quota in Ireland. The milk price projections for the baseline and milk 
quota expansion scenario, outlined earlier in the paper, are used to estimate the 
economic value of quota in a national market under the baseline and milk quota 
expansion scenarios. The price projections show that the milk price declines faster under 
the milk quota expansion scenario as the additional milk supply dampens the price. It is 
therefore expected that the quantity of quota demanded is likely to be lower under the 
quota expansion scenario than the baseline, because the profitability of production has 
declined and because farmers have access to “free quota” under this policy reform and 
thus their capacity for additional expansion diminishes. It therefore follows that demand 
will be lower at any given price. Figure 4.7 presents the quota trade prices in a national 
market under the baseline and milk quota expansion scenarios. 
 
Figure 4.7: National Milk Quota Market: Baseline and Milk Quota Expansion 
Scenarios 
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As is evident from Figure 4.7 the trade price of quota would decline significantly if a 
policy of gradual quota expansion was implemented. It is estimated that in a national 
exchange the trade price would decline from 30 cent per litre to 18 cent per litre. If 
farmers are operating under a false certainty that quotas will remain binding until 2015 
but if the outcome of the CAP Health Check involves a quota expansion policy like the 
one analysed here, then farmers will have over paid for quota by up to 12 cent per litre 
on almost 640 million litres. This policy uncertainty imposes a considerable additional 
quota cost on the sector, based on the trade quantity of 640 million litres the cost is in 
the order of€76.8million.    
 
4.6. Discussion 
The results presented in this paper support the theory that the more freely quota is 
traded, the more efficient the outcome for the sector as a whole. It is estimated that the 
regionalisation of milk quota trade in Ireland causes an approximate €20 million 
efficiency loss to the dairy farm sector. This is cause for concern especially in the 
context of EU quota expansion or removal. Research has shown that Ireland is well 
placed to prosper following the elimination of milk quotas in 2015 (Binfield et al 2007). 
However, it is clear that the efficiency of the sector as a whole would be better served if 
a national market for milk quota was implemented in the intervening period between 
now and quota elimination.  
 The analysis presented above develops a framework to demonstrate the inefficiencies of 
regionalised trade. However, the inefficiency estimate (€20 million) should be 
interpreted with caution. This paper estimates the economic value of quota rather than 
the trade price. If the regional divergence in quota price is greater than estimated here, 
then the efficiency loss will be greater. In the analysis presented above, quota values 
range from 35 CPL to 21 CPL, however data on quota trade in Ireland show a range of 
45 CPL in the south to 12 CPL in the west. Given that the divergence between quota 
prices is larger than the estimated here, it can be concluded that the efficiency loss is 
greater. The pertinent question then is; why the difference between the economic value 
of quota and the price.  
 
There are a number of reasons why the economic value of quota will differ from the 
price. These reasons relate to the data and methodology, farmer behaviour and other 
uncaptured factors. In relation to data, the sample used could only be robustly 
disaggregated into 4 regions. In reality, quota trades in over 20 local areas, and 
therefore the quota trade prices are likely to reflect the local conditions more accurately 
than the data used. The methodology for estimating quota value is based on the axioms 
of profit maximisation and perfect certainty. It is assumed that farmers are fully aware 
of their production costs and have perfect certainty of future prices and that they 
behave to maximise profit under these conditions.  As a result non-profit maximising 
behaviour is not simulated and therefore, the analysis does not account for farmers 
bidding uneconomical prices for quota. The recent quota trade price of 45 CPL recorded 
in the south of Ireland suggests that many farmers are bidding over their personal 
economic quota value.  
 
There are a number of factors influencing farmers’ behaviour that cannot be captured in 
a profit maximising model.  Evidence from co-operative supplier numbers suggests that 
farm-level structural change has been more rapid in the border and west of Ireland over 
the past decade and as such expanding farmers in these regions have their demand 
satisfied. Structural change has been more sluggish in the south and east meaning 
farmers wishing to expand in these regions have pent-up demand. Anecdotal evidence 
suggests that there is a greater frustration with the regionalised system in these regions 
and farmers are determined to acquire quota. The prevailing quota price data suggests 
that this determination may be at an economic loss when one considers the profitability 
of production in these regions. It is very difficult for an economic study such as this one 
to capture these sentiments and to quantify their effect on the quota trade price.  If 
data permitted a more detailed analysis of the impact of farmer behaviour on quota 
trade prices would prove an interesting area of further research and may be very 
relevant in the future if auctions for polluting licences, such as carbon permits, become 
a common element of agricultural policy.   
 
The factors outlined above in relation to farmer behaviour may lead us to underestimate 
the inefficiencies associated with quota trade, however the irrefutable conclusion 
remains that regionalised quota trade results in efficiency losses for the sector. While 
the paper focuses exclusively on these losses, the welfare and equity implications of 
such a system should not go unmentioned. As the quota exchange system now operates 
in Ireland, a retiring or exiting farmer in some southern regions could sell quota for up 
to 45 CPL while in other regions retiring farmers would receive 12 CPL. This situation 
has substantial equity and welfare issues. The farming press and the lobby groups in 
Ireland seem to prioritise the interests of the expanding farmers by calling for lower 
quota prices. Exiting and retiring farmers interests seem to be less articulated. A welfare 
analysis of the regionalisation of milk quota trade would prove an interesting area of 
further research.  
 
Finally this paper also explores the adverse effects of policy uncertainty. A 
methodological framework is developed to quantify the cost of an early 
abolition/expansion of quota in the EU. The results show that if farmers are unaware of 
policy changes and/or they receive insufficient notice about the changes that they will 
pay inappropriate prices for quota. This introduces an additional cost to the sector and a 
subsequent inefficiency. The results highlight the importance to disseminating 
information about policy change to farmers as soon as possible.   
 
 
CHAPTER 6 
 
 
MODELLING MILK QUOTA TRADE 
 
6.1. Introduction  
A major change in dairy policy happened in Ireland at the beginning of 2007 when a 
new quota trade system, Quota Exchange Programme, was first introduced. The new 
programme is market oriented in nature in contrast to a government based system in 
previous quota trades. It allows farmers to bid for buying or selling milk quota at their 
own prices. A market clearing price is calculated based on these bids and quota are 
traded at that price. This is a major departure from the earlier trade systems where 
quota trading prices were set by the Department of Agriculture. However, this 
programme still continues with a ring fenced quota trade like previous trade systems. In 
Ireland, all dairy farmers are contracted to a milk processor and under this ring fencing, 
quota trade is allowed only between participating farmers within a milk processing area.  
 
Further changes in dairy quota policy in Ireland are inevitable following the decision to 
abolish milk quota from EU member states by 2015. These changes would aim at 
softening the impact of quota abolition on dairy sector in Ireland. Some possible 
changes have already been identified such as removal of ring fencing, progressive 
increase in quota quantity, decreasing quota price and removing super levy. Among 
these possible changes, the removal of ring fencing in quota trade can be considered as 
the most immediate change which has a potential to increase efficiency in national milk 
production and also assumed to have the lowest negative impact on farm income. 
Hence, in this study, we aim to determine possible impacts of removal of ring fencing on 
Irish dairy sector. We used a simulation technique to examine such an impact under two 
milk quota trade scenarios; first a regional trade where ring fencing is widened to a 
particular region and then a national trade where ring fencing is removed entirely and a 
free quota trade was allowed in the country. We first used a multi period deterministic 
model to arrive at market clearing prices and then used a farm level static linear 
programming model to simulate quota trade under these scenarios.  
 The following section reviews different approaches taken to simulate future quota trade 
in the EU and later sections describe the methodology used for the simulation of quota 
trade and provide results for the two trade scenarios especially looking at the changes 
on farm number, milk production and farm income.  
 
6.2. Approaches taken to determine impacts of quota trade  
Since last few years, many studies have been done in different member states of the EU 
to analyse changes in dairy policy. Studies on quota trade and quota removal comprise 
the majority of these works. Most of these studies used either econometric or 
mathematical models. Boots et al. (1997) used an econometric model to simulate 
different trade scenarios to analyze efficiency loss due to distortions in Dutch milk quota 
trade. Sckokai (2003) also used econometric models to estimate quota supply functions 
under tradable milk quota in three dairy regions in Italy. An EU consortium of French 
and Dutch researchers used an integrated production and processing/demand models to 
study impacts of possible changes in milk quota policy for the preparation of the EU 
commission’s report (EU Commission, 2002). Most of the models stated above calculate 
a profit function through inputs and outputs parameter used on a farm. Although the 
models work fine for a profit maximising farm, yet by using fixed input-output 
coefficients, these econometric models loose flexibility to change management practices 
on a farm hence changing these coefficients. This makes the econometric models very 
rigid on farmers’ decision making on farms. For instance, a farmer can change feed 
regimes to produce same level of yield but at a different input costs. Similarly, under an 
unconstrained quota trade scenario, input costs are the only constrained placed over the 
milk production whereas in reality stocking rate and availability of labour are also some 
of the limiting resources on farm. As pointed out by Yates and Rehman (2002) 
econometric models rely too much upon estimates based on observed results and not 
best suited for future policy impact studies. 
 
A wide range of mathematical programming models has also been used in quota policy 
studies ranging from a globally oriented aggregated models (Boumamra et al., 2002; 
Lips and Rieder, 2005; EU Commission, 2008) to a more farm based models (Boots et 
al., 1997; Heuttel et al., 2005). The aggregated models (general and partial equilibrium 
models) are used in quota trade at a regional, national level as well as international 
trade under different trade scenarios. For example, Lips and Rieder (2005) used a 
modified GTAP model to analyse possible abolition of quota trade from the EU. They 
used dairy products as one of the commodities traded between EU member states, the 
US, oceanic countries and rest of the world and simulated a scenario where milk quota 
is removed from the EU. They showed that Ireland would increase milk production by 
38% when milk quota is abolished. Similarly, a partially equilibrium model, DRAM, was 
used by Dutch researchers incorporated with an Input-Output (IO) model to simulate 
quota abolition in the Netherlands at the regional level (Helming and Peerlings, 2003). 
The model differentiates 14 regions in the country and suggested that under total 
abolition of milk quota, milk production would increase by up to 11% and dairy would 
substitute a large part of arable production from the north, middle and south-west of 
the Netherlands. More recently, a partial equilibrium model was used by researchers to 
analyse the impact of a number of policy options regarding the abolition of milk quota 
from the EU (EU commission, 2008) study. This study also was based on trading of dairy 
products between EU countries and other major dairy trading counties of the world. This 
study provided simulated results for different quota removal scenarios such as annual 
quota increase (1% and 2%) till 2015 when quota is abolished and a sudden quota 
removal (in 2009 and in 2015). The study suggests that under the gradual increase 
scenario, EU countries will have mixed type of impact, for instance Ireland will increase 
production to meet annual quota increase where as the production in the UK will 
decrease. Under the sudden quota removal scenario, the EU production is projected to 
increase by 5% in the first year with a consequence on decrease in milk price (-10%). 
 
The equilibrium models are able to provide a good analysis for the policy impact on dairy 
sector in these studies. However, as these models only take aggregate values for 
different parameters used for the study, they are not suitable at farm levels especially 
when the objective of the study is to determine impact on different farm types and 
structural change at a disaggregated level.  Farm level models are the mathematical 
models which are disaggregate in nature and a choice of technique when the policy 
impact studies need to be focused at individual farm level. However, it requires a large 
quantity of data which makes it less worthy if such data is not available. Only a few 
studies have been carried out in the dairy sector to determine the effects of quota trade 
using farm level models. The ongoing trade negotiations for WTO agreement could be 
one of the reasons why the majority of policy impact studies used aggregated models 
and focused on international trade and market prices. Aggregated models are much 
better suited for trade policies in between trading nations. However, a study on an 
impact of a new policy can only be complete if farmers’ responses at the farm level are 
also carried out.  
 
German researchers have used a farm level comparative static model, FARMIS, to 
simulate quota trade in Germany and France which is later on extended to other 
member states (Huettel et al., 2005). This model is an optimising farm level model 
which was disaggregated to representative farm group level. The model was used on 
farm groups rather than individual farms to reduce data errors and ensure farm 
confidentiality. The model used endogenously generated marginal price of quota as a 
criteria to trade milk quota between farm groups. The model successfully projected 
quota movement between different regions and also structural change occurred in dairy 
sector in these regions. The results showed a tendency for small farms to reduce milk 
production in both countries.  
 
For our own study, we selected farm level optimising models because our aims are to 
examine the impact of a quota trade under different market restrictions and determine if 
quota moves from one area to another as well as any structural change that may 
ensues. Although we used a farm level model as the German work, our farm model is 
more disaggregated in nature. As stated earlier, FARMIS used averaged farm level data 
for a representative farm in a farm group; a lot of detail on response of individual farms 
is lost. The small farms which are reducing production cannot be identified on their 
production level or efficiency level as while forming farm groups, the FARMIS used 
region, size and system as stratification criteria. As agricultural farms are 
multidimensional (different levels of production, management, expenditures and profits) 
in nature, it makes them widely diverse from each other even if they are similar in one 
or two characteristics. There could be a number of sub groups within a group is such 
cases. For example, our earlier study showed there were at least 4 different sub groups 
of large dairy farms in south region of Ireland when 6 criteria (region, system, size, 
production level, farm income and family labour) were used in a cluster analysis 
(Shrestha and Hennessy, 2006). Those sub groups were similar in farm size but differed 
widely in production level and farm income and showed different extent of impacts of 
policy change on farm profits. Hence, grouping them based on only few criteria would 
overlook many issues in analysing impacts of policy changes on farms. For that reason, 
we used disaggregated data at individual farm levels in the study which allowed us to 
explore the impact of quota trade in more detail. Another difference in our methodology 
is the use of a multi period deterministic model in determining quota market clearing 
price and incorporating that price into the farm level model. This enabled us to simulate 
the quota trade based on the quota value not just for the modelled single year but on a 
number of years when quota still exists.   
 
6.3. Methodology 
A schematic diagram of the methodology is presented in Figure 6.1. The first step of this 
methodology is to integrate farm level data taken from the 2004 Irish National Farm 
Survey, NFS (Connolly et al., 2005) and price projections from FAPRI-Ireland model 
(Binfield et al., 2003) into a multi-period deterministic model to determine milk quota 
equilibrium price. This is the market clearing price where quota is assumed to be traded. 
This price is then used in the LP model along with farm level data to simulate milk quota 
trade under different market scenarios. The LP model optimises the farm margin by 
either buying or selling milk quota at this equilibrium price. Brief descriptions of the 
models are provided below. Two different market scenarios; i) the regional trade 
scenario where quota trade is restricted within designated regions and ii) the national 
trade scenario which is a free market where no such trade restriction is applied; are 
used to simulate milk quota trade in Ireland. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.1: Schematic diagram of the methodology 
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6.3.1.  Farm level data 
Farm level data from dairy farms from the NFS 2004, was used for this study. Farms 
were first separated in three arbitrary but distinctive dairy regions; BMW, South East 
and South West. These regions are identified based on market clearing prices from the 
First Exchange programme (Figure 6.2). Farm level data was available for 119 farms in 
the BWM, 254 farms in the South East and 85 farms in the South West regions. These 
data were then aggregated to regional levels by using regional weighting factors 
provided by the NFS.   
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.2: The first quota exchange 2007-08 (source: Farmers Journal, 2007) 
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6.3.2. Models 
Multi-period deterministic model: emphasising on equilibrium price 
The model determines milk quota selling and buying prices for individual farms included 
in the survey and upgrades the results to a regional or national level by aggregating 
them using regional and national weights. The model considers four major factors to 
arrive to an estimated quota value, they are; (i) the outlook for milk prices, (ii) costs of 
production, (iii) the number of years that the quota will produce a profit, and (iv) the 
cost of producing the additional milk. These four factors determine the value of quota 
and therefore should guide any farmer’s calculation on what to pay for quota if 
expanding production and what to accept for quota if exiting production. Price indices 
from the FAPRI-Ireland model is used to project different prices and costs from 2006 to 
2015 when quota is assumed to be abolished. By using the outlook for prices and costs 
of different producers it is possible to determine (i) the minimum breakeven price that a 
farmer should accept if selling quota by using equation 1; and (ii) the maximum 
affordable price a farmer can bid if expanding production by using equation 2. 
              n 
QVs  =  ∑ (Rt - Ct) …………………………………………..(1)                           
             t=1 
               n 
QVd  =  ∑ (Rt - Ct -Et) …………………………………………..(2)                           
              t=1 
where, QVs =  quota value for selling; QVd = quota value for buying; Rt = returns from 
per litre of milk; Ct = costs per litre of milk production; Et = cost producing additional 
milk and t = number of years quota exists (1,…,n) 
 
By aggregating these estimates using regional or national weights, it is possible to 
produce estimates of the regional or national supply of and demand for milk quota. 
These values can be plotted in a graph to determine an equivalent price i.e., a market 
clearing price. It is very important to note however that these estimates assume that 
farmers are profit maximisers and that they will only bid and accept prices that are 
economical. It should therefore be noted that this analysis will provide estimates of the 
value of quota rather than the actual price at which it may be traded.  
 
Figure 6.3: A competitive market of milk quota trade  
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The value of quota can be measured economically but the price that will prevail in the 
market will vary depending on the willingness of farmers to buy quota at uneconomical 
prices either for reasons of utility or lack of knowledge of the true value of quota for 
their own situation. Here, the aggregated return from milk production after discounting 
for price deflation is assumed to be the economic value of quota. The aggregated 
figures for the supply and demand of milk quota are plotted in a graph to present 
normative curves (Figure 6.3). The point of intersection of the supply and demand 
curves provides us with an equilibrium price (pe) and quantity traded (qe) in a 
competitive market. 
 
Linear Programming (LP) model: simulating quota trade 
A farm level static linear programming (LP) model is developed for the study to 
determine the quota movement within an area of interest. That area of interest could be 
a region or a nation. A LP model operates by maximising or minimising an objective 
function subject to a number of constraints. In this case, farm gross margin (z) for a 
region with f farms was maximised within the constraint of the limiting resources Rf. The 
general form of the model is; 
 
Max  z  =  Σ (pf * xf) – (cf * xf) 
s.t.     Af * xf   Rf 
  xf 0 
where, xf is the farm activities for farm type f, pf is a measure of the returns and cf are 
the costs procured for xf activity, Af is an input – output coefficient for activity xf, while 
Rf is a limiting resource such as milk quota, land and labour  
 
A schematic diagram of the LP model used for this study is presented in Figure 6 where 
a dotted rectangle represents a farm outside which is a market. Livestock activity (dairy 
and beef) is the core part of the model with outputs (milk and animals) from this activity 
going to the market. All other farm activities such as grass production, stock 
replacement and labour management take place to support the livestock activity. The 
model allows a farm to have dairy and beef animals on farm which are mutually 
replaceable. For the Irish context, the land transfer between farms in not included in the 
model and it is assumed that only a maximum of 50% of the beef animals can be 
replaced by the dairy animals on existing farm land. However, land transfer activity can 
be included in the model if there is a possibility of land transfer activity between farms. 
It is also assumed that a farm can expand milk production through two stages; the first 
stage where the farm can accommodate additional dairy animals without incurring major 
investments; and the second stage where any further addition in animals will require 
adjustment costs such building costs (€300/cow) and bulk tank costs (€520/cow) for 
each of the additional dairy cow. 
  
Figure 6.4: A schematic diagram of the farm level LP model 
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The number of livestock on a farm is constrained by a stocking rate on available farm 
land. The stocking rate is based on the farm level NFS data for individual farms and is 
fixed for each farm. As both stocking rate and land on a farm are fixed, the only way to 
increase animal numbers on a farm is by replacing other types of animals. Farm land 
can be used both for grazing and silage production however it is assumed that grassland 
can be used only up to 50% of total land for conserving grass. Grass, grass silage and 
concentrate are the main feeds available to the livestock. The model allots these feeds 
to animals based on their energy, protein and dry matter intake requirements. This is 
determined by type, age and production level of an individual animal (Alderman and 
Cottrill, 1993). A minimum level of concentrate is used on farm to maintain milk yield 
level which is also taken from the farm level data for each farm. All of the concentrate 
feed used on farm is bought in while grass silage is either produced on farm or bought 
in. Each farm activity in the model (dairy, beef and grass conservation activities) 
requires a level of labour which is based on farm management handbook (Teagasc, 
2007). The model uses family as well as paid labour where required. All labour used in 
the model is assumed to be skilled labour suited for all farm activities.  
 
As shown on Figure 6.4, besides resources that exists or produced within a farm such as 
land and grass, a farm bring in additional resources such as milk quota, animal 
replacements, feed (concentrate and grass silage) and hired labour from the market 
while milk quota, animals and milk are the farm’s output that is sold to the market. 
Farmers selling milk quota have to sell dairy animals as well, as they are not allowed to 
produce without a quota and will be unprofitable for a farm continue keeping them. The 
model assumes farmers receiving optimum price for the sold animals based on the NFS 
data. However, it should be noted that in reality there is always a risk of receiving lower 
price at the time of selling when one is exiting the business (Pennings and Meulenberg, 
1998). 
 
Quota in the model 
On an individual farm, milk production activity is constrained by quota level available to 
the farm. Total milk quota level available to a farm is taken from the NFS based on the 
total number of animals on farm and milk yield per animal. Farms are allowed to 
increase milk production by buying in or to exit dairy production by selling out milk 
quota. Transfer of milk quota is possible between farms at a regional or national level 
depending upon the model running at a regional or national level. Further constraints 
are placed on a possible transfer of the quota so that a farm can buy milk quota only if 
other farms are selling quota within a regional or national level, such as; 
 
n                            n 
∑    bquota(f,y) ≤ ∑  squota(ff,y);  y        
f=1                         ff=1 
 
where, bquota is bought quota; squota is sold quota; f is the n number of farm types; y 
is the number of years, and ff is an alias of f such that ff С f but ff ≠ f  
 
To balance total quota present in the country, the model runs under a condition that 
total amounts of quota sell and quota buy are equal;  
 
∑ bquota(f,y) = ∑ squota(f,y)  f, y 
  
Another condition in the model sets a quota selling farm to sell its entire quota or sells 
none to represent non-existence of marginal sale of quota in reality in Ireland. The LP 
model simulates quota movement within a well defined area such as at regional/national 
level based on the input data set. In the model, individual farms maximises farm profits 
individually within their limiting farm resources. Quota trade is the only link provided 
between farms within the area of interest. Because of its optimising property, the LP 
model would allow the milk quota to flow from farms making a loss to profitable farms 
which provides us an opportunity to explore the impact of a free market of quota trade 
on dairy farms. This also provides information about the farms which are exiting or 
expanding under a quota trade.  Under the quota exchange programme in Ireland, there 
is a limit of a maximum of 80,000 l placed on bids for quota demanded. As this paper 
simulates a freer market, we removed this limit and run the model without any 
restrictions on bids placed by the farmers.  
 
Trade Scenarios 
There are two types of trade scenarios for this study; a regional trade scenario and a 
national trade scenario. As stated early, we identified three regions based on the First 
Exchange market clearing prices. The reason behind identifying these regions is to select 
regions where milk production differs from each other as much as possible. This allows 
us to see the impact of any changes in dairy policy in different production levels and we 
assumed that this will provide us with a better picture of quota movement from one 
distinctive region to another if ring fencing is removed. As we know from our previous 
works, quota moves from smaller farms to larger efficient farms when quota is allowed 
to be traded within a ring fenced area (Shrestha and Hennessy, 2008). The regional and 
national trade scenarios would allow us to determine if quota movement will follow a 
similar trend. If such movement exists then it will allow us to identify the direction of 
quota movement and quantify the amount of quota movement.   
 
6.4. Results 
6.4.1. Multi-period deterministic model  
Using the regional aggregate weights, the model determined total milk production 
(supply) in the three study regions as shown in Table 3. The figures suggest that the 
BMW and South West regions share about 25% while the South East region shares 
remaining 50% of total milk production in the country. On the demand side, the model 
combined both forms of milk expansion as stated in earlier section (i.e., i. no major 
investment but increase yield with better management and ii. Replacing 50% of beef 
animals with dairy animals) and determined that a total of 3 bil l of milk quota is in 
demand nationally. The regional distribution of demand for quota follows similar 
proportions as of the national milk supply (Table 6.1).  
 
Table 6.1: Characteristics of three dairy regions 
BMW South East South West 
Total milk production (bil l) 1.3 2.7 1.3 
Total demand (bil l) 0.7 1.7 0.6 
 
For each of the regions, the aggregated supply and demand of milk quota was plotted 
against quota price as shown in Figure 6.5. The intersections of these two normative 
curves determined the market clearing (equilibrium) prices for the regions. The BMW 
has the lowest price at 11.5 cpl and the South West has the highest price at 18 cpl while 
the South East region has a price at 17.5 cpl.  
 
Figure 6.5: Equilibrium price for three regions using normative supply ( _S) 
and demand ( _D) curves 
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Figure 6.6: Quota equilibrium price for a pooled national supply and demand 
for milk quota 
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South East 17.5 cpl 
National 14.5 cpl
South West 18 cpl 
BMW 11.5 cpl 
 
 
At these prices, the South East traded the highest amount of quota at 850 mil l followed 
by the BMW region at 450 mil l traded. Although the farms in the South West region 
have the highest market clearing price for quota, the amount traded is the lowest in the 
region compared to other two regions. To determine a national averaged quota clearing 
price, all demand and supply for quota in each of the regions are pooled together and 
once again plotted against milk quota price. This provided with a national equilibrium 
price of 14.5 cpl and a trade of 1.5 bil l quota at that price (Figure 6.6). 
 
6.4.2. Milk production and farm number 
Regional scenario 
Under this scenario, regional market clearing prices estimated by the deterministic 
model (i.e, 11.5 cpl for the BMW, 17.5 cpl for the South East and 18 cpl for the South 
West regions), are used in the LP model. A total of 204,628,835 l quota is traded 
nationally. As shown in Table 6.2, South East region traded the highest quantity of 
quota (42%) than other two regions (BMW 32% and South West 26%). At the given 
quota clearing prices, there is only a small structural change in the Southern regions 
with less than 2% change in exiting and expanding farm numbers. However, in the 
BMW the expanding farms outnumbered exiting farms by 6%. This suggests that in this 
region there are few very large farms making loss which exited milk production covering 
the entire quota demand of the region.  
 
Table 6.2: Total milk quota and number of farms expanding and exiting in the 
three regions 
Regions (milk quota clearing price) Expanding Exiting 
BMW (11.5 cpl)   
Quota traded (l) 66,364,588 “ “ 
Number of farms (% of total farms) 736 (10%) 273(4%) 
South East (17.5 cpl)   
Quota traded (l) 86,595,822 “ “ 
Number of farms (% of total farms) 951 (8%) 780 (7%) 
South West (18 cpl)   
Quota traded (l) 51,668,425 “ “ 
Number of farms (% of total farms) 643 (9%) 827 (11%) 
 
Based on the NFS, 2004 data, there are 26,700 dairy farms in Ireland and under the 
regional scenario, 7% of them are projected to exit dairy production and 96% are 
projected to expand. To determine the difference between exiting farms and rest of the 
farms regionally, a t-test is carried out on 11 farm variables for each region (Table 6.3). 
The results show that in the BMW region, exiting farms are almost double in land size 
than remaining farms. These farms also had the lower milk yield per cow but higher 
replacement costs. These farms also have a highly significant number of beef animals on 
farms which might indicate a possibility for these farms to quit dairy farming but 
continue beef production. This possible transfer was not covered by the existing farm 
level model.  In both of the Southern regions, the most significant farm variables in 
determining farms to exit or stay in dairy production are almost identical. Exiting farms 
characteristically have larger dairy numbers, higher milk yield, higher milk price and 
lower production costs.  In general, milk yield is the most significant indicator for a dairy 
farm in all regions along with production costs in determining if the farm is staying or 
exiting dairy production.   
 
Table 6.3: Characteristics of exiting farms compared with the remaining 
farms under regional trade 
 Border South East South West 
 Exiting Rest Exiting Rest Exiting Rest 
Land (ha) 100.8** 54.1** 56.3 65.3 38.2 52.3 
Dairy number (lu) 46 48 32** 57** 24** 46** 
Beef number (lu) 76** 30** 44 41 19 26 
Stocking rate 
(lu/ha) 
1.3 1.5 1.3 1.5 1.2 1.4 
Milk yield (l/cow) 3864** 5150** 3992** 5190** 2994** 4683** 
Milk price (cpl) 0.25 0.25 0.24** 0.25** 0.24** 0.25** 
Calf price (€) 167 188 225** 194** 211 200 
Paid labour (man 
hr) 
0.48 0.25 0.17 0.28 0.01 0.08 
Replacement costs 
(€/cow) 
1533** 1108** 1105 1190 1029 1089 
Overhead costs 
(€/cow) 
582 470 607* 497* 827** 398** 
Direct costs (€/cow) 554 545 482 477 446 427 
 
National scenario 
In this scenario, the entire national farm data for dairy farms (#458 farms) from the 
NFS dataset is used.  Once again, NFS weights were used on farms for their aggregation 
at the national level. The pooled national quota equilibrium price (i.e., 14.5 cpl) from the 
deterministic model is used and once again no restriction on the amount of total quota 
trade is set under this scenario. The model results shows that once the regional trade is 
widened to the national level, amount of traded quota is almost doubled to that of 
traded under regional scenario (Table 6.4). The quota trade in different regions is 
different compared to that under regional trade scenario. The national market clearing 
price is higher than regional market clearing price in the BMW hence as expected, quota 
supply is increased in this region under national scenario. The supply of milk quota was 
44% higher than the demand for the quota in this region.  
 
Table 6.4: Total milk quota and number of farms expanding and exiting in 
each region at an clearing price of 14.5cpl 
Regions  Expanding Exiting Difference 
BMW    
Quota amount 90,309,591 130,400,949 - 40,091,358 
Number of farms (% of total farms) 1052 (14%) 829 (11%)  
South East    
Quota amount 235,395,446 212,496,788 + 22,898,658 
Number of farms (% of total farms) 2,252 (19%) 1,171 (10%)  
South West    
Quota amount 79,111,385 61,918,686 + 17,192,699 
Number of farms (% of total farms) 932 (13%) 923 (13%)  
Total quota traded 404,816,423 l 
 
While in both South East and South West regions, the demand for milk quota is greater 
than the supply. There is almost double the number of farms expanding in the South 
East region compared to the number of farms exiting dairy sector. However, the number 
of expanding and exiting farms is almost similar in the South West region. In the BMW 
region only 69% of the supply is taken up by expanding farms within the region and 
31% of the supply went out of the region. In the South East region there is 10% more 
quota demanded than that supplied while in the South West region 22% of the quota is 
demanded more than the quota supplied. The higher demand from farms in the 
southern region and higher supply from farms in the BMW region suggests that milk 
quota would move from north to south if regional market is expanded to a national 
market. In the equilibrium condition, 57% of the over supplied quota from the BMW 
region would go to dairy farms in the South East region and rest of 43% would be taken 
up the dairy farms in the South West region.  
 
Under this scenario, a total of 11% of dairy farms are projected to exit dairy production 
and 16% to expand nationally. The characteristics of farms exiting dairy production 
under the national scenario are very similar to those of farms exiting under regional 
scenario (Table 6.5).  In the BMW region, types of farm variable that are significant in 
exiting dairy do not change much. The exiting farms are typical large farms with higher 
number of beef animals on farms, lower milk yield and higher production costs. Besides 
these variables, paid labour also became a significant characteristic with exiting farms 
having higher paid labour units under the national scenario. In the South East region, 
milk yield and dairy replacement costs are the most significant farm variable in deciding 
whether to quit dairy production or not. The price obtained for milk and female calves 
also play a significant role in quitting the production in this region. In the South West 
region, stocking rate and replacement costs are the most significant variable for farms 
to exit dairy production. Besides those variables, milk price obtained by the farms is also 
important in deciding to sell entire quota in this region. However, milk yield and over 
head costs did not stay as significant variables to decide in exiting dairy production 
anymore under the national scenario. However, In general, characteristics of exiting 
farms in the BMW remained the same as were under the regional scenario whereas in 
the southern regions, types of variables that would characterise the exiting are changed 
slightly. In the South East region, number of dairy animals on farm was not a 
differentiating characteristic anymore but cost of replacing dairy cows became a 
significant variable to make decision. Similarly, in the South West region, number of 
dairy animals and milk yield did not remain significant characteristics of the two sets of 
farms but stocking rate and replacement costs became significant.   
 
 
Table 6.5: Characteristics of exiting farms compared with the remaining 
farms under national trade  
 Border South East South West 
 Exiting Rest Exiting Rest Exiting Rest 
Land (ha) 86.9** 53.0** 71.4 64.3 60.9 50.4 
Dairy number (lu) 57 47 48 56 32 45 
Beef number (lu) 63** 29** 50 40 24 25 
Stocking rate 
(lu/ha) 
1.3 1.5 1.4 1.5 0.9** 1.4** 
Milk yield (l/cow) 4127** 5193** 4286** 5205** 3904 4593 
Milk price (cpl) 25.3 25.3 24.7* 25.3* 23.8* 25.0* 
Calf price (€) 175 189 214* 195* 213 200 
Paid labour (man 
hr) 
0.78** 0.20** 0.27 0.27 0.19 0.07 
Replacement costs 
(€/cow) 
1440** 1094** 1565** 1149** 1410** 1059** 
 Overhead costs 
(€/cow) 
607* 460* 515 505 553 424 
Direct costs (€/cow) 552 545 498 475 346 434 
 
 
6.4.3. Farm Net Margins 
 
The farm net margin was another indicator that we selected to determine the changes 
under the two trade scenarios. In the BMW region, the national trade scenario seems to 
increase the number of farms with higher farm net margins compared to that under the 
regional trade scenario (Figure 6.7). Under regional scenario, only 30% of the farms 
were earning more than 30,000 a year which increased to 40% when a national trade 
was allowed. As the model was only run for one year the farm exiting dairy production 
still included in these groupings. In this region, the lower income group also consisted of 
a larger number of exiting farms compared to higher income groups under both 
scenarios. As shown in the figure, under the national scenario, the lower two income 
groups have 669 farms which sold their entire quota and exited dairy farming when 
quota trade moved from a regional to a national trade. In the top two income 
categories, there are 161 farms which moved up the income group by selling their 
quota.  
 
Figure 6.7: Farm distribution under two trade scenarios based on farm net 
margin in the BMW region5 [x-axis (farm net margins, €): 1 = 0 – 9999, 2 = 
10000 – 29999, 3 = 30000 – 49999 and 4 = more than 50000] 
 
                                                 
5 Exiting farm numbers are for national scenario only. 
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Figure  6.8. Farm distribution under two trade scenarios based on farm net 
margin in the South East region [x-axis (farm net margins, €): 1 = 0 – 9999, 2 
= 10000 – 29999, 3 = 30000 – 49999 and 4 = more than 50000] 
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The South East region has the least number of farms earning below € 9999 than any 
other regions. Figure 6.8 shows much uniform distribution of number of farms in upper 
income groups. There is not much change in the farm numbers in different income 
groups under both the scenarios. However, it is interesting to see a decrease in the 
number of farms in the upper income groups. The reason behind that is with a decrease 
in quota price under national scenario more farms are able to buy quota which spread 
available quota over a wider number of farms.  Hence some of the high income farms 
which were able to buy more quota under the regional scenario are not able to do so 
and they have a decrease in profits and move towards lower income group.   
 
In the South West region, farm number in higher net margin groups remain almost 
same but farm number in the € 10,000 – € 29,999 increased by 6 % whereas number of 
farms in the less than € 10,000 group decreased by 4% (Figure 10). The lowest group 
consists of almost 18% of the farms that exited left dairy production under the national 
trade scenario. The highest income group had the lowest number of farms exiting the 
production.  
 
Figure 6.9: Farm distribution under two trade scenarios based on farm net 
margin in the South West region [x-axis (farm net margins, €): 1 = 0 – 9999, 
2 = 10000 – 29999, 3 = 30000 – 49999 and 4 = more than 50000] 
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Conclusions 
 
The simulated results for a regional and national quota trade provided some insights on 
possible outlook of dairy sector in Ireland. Quota is expected to move out of less 
efficient farms (and regions) to efficient ones. This suggests that there will some extent 
of structural change in dairy sector when trade is widened to a regional or a national 
level. The model results confirms it and shows that under a regional quota trade there is 
a projection of 7% diary farms moving out of dairy production where as 9% of the 
farms will seek an expansion on production. Moving from a regional to a national quota 
trade will see a doubling of total amount of quota traded. The results project the farms 
in the southern regions to be more efficient producers as 31% of the total quota 
supplied in the BWM region would be taken up by the farms in the southern regions. 
The number of exiting farms also increases under the national trade scenario (11%) 
where as the number of expanding farms increase by 16%.  
 
Would a removal of ring fence and a subsequent structural change have a positive effect 
on dairy sector in preparation for up coming quota abolition? The simulation definitely 
suggests that the wider ring fenced area is allowed, the more quota moves from un-
profitable farms to efficient farms. This can be interpreted that if we remove ring fencing 
from the quota trade, a larger numbers of the less efficient farm would have an 
opportunity to exit dairy production before their quota asset becomes worthless. 
Similarly, profitable farms would have a greater opportunity to increase their production 
and improve their profits. For both sets of farms quota the effect of quota abolition can 
assume to be minimal as; for the first type of farms, they would have benefited from 
their quota value long way before it becomes worthless and for the second type, they 
already have an opportunity to increase production up to their optimal levels, would be 
better prepared when quota will not be a limiting factor anymore and have sufficient 
time to adjust for any possible decrease in milk price as a consequence of such change.  
 
However, it should be noted here that our results show only a small portion of quota to 
be traded (14%) compared to total quota demand nationally even under a free national 
market. There is only 11% of farms exiting and 16% of farms expanding in that market 
condition. The model projected rest of 73% of farms to be profitable in varying degrees 
and remained unchanged under modelled conditions. Now the question can be asked 
how much impact quota abolition will have on these farms. Some of the farms in this 
category may be at a marginal profit level and might need additional measures besides 
the removal of ring fencing to minimise any negative effects of quota abolition. 
CHAPTER 7 
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7.1 Summary 
 Significant potential exists for expansion in output and profit on Irish dairy farms 
 Successful systems while profitable, must also be sustainable in terms of staff, 
animals and the environment, and allow for a quality lifestyle and time-off. 
 Profitable future farm systems must be simple, based on higher stocking rates, 
an appropriate mean calving date, high EBI genetics, proactive grassland 
management and effective use of supplements. 
 The imposition of the technologies discussed herein has the potential to increase 
the profitability of milk production on Irish dairy farms by €1,800 per hectare. 
 
7.2 Introduction 
The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) was introduced in Europe to ensure EU food 
security in a recovering post war EU economy by delivering higher less volatile prices to 
producers (Whetstone, 1999). By the late 1970s, milk production driven by high prices 
outstripped milk consumption and on that basis, in April 1984 a dissuasive super levy 
quota was introduced on individual producers which penalised supply beyond a fixed 
quota. Recent analysis carried out within EU has suggested that milk quotas are now 
constraining the development of an efficient European dairy industry (van Berkum and 
Helming, 2006). Dairy farming in Ireland is now at a crossroads. Behind us lies a 
farming environment where all farmers received a similar price for milk, milk prices were 
high and stable and emphasis was on maximising profit per litre of milk quota (Shalloo 
et al., 2004). Ahead of us lies a quota free more volatile milk price environment, 
differentiated multiple component pricing, continued reform of EU agricultural policy and 
increased environmental regulation. A study by Lips and Rieder (2005) projected that 
quota abolition would allow production to move to areas of competitive advantage 
within Europe such as Denmark, Ireland and the Netherlands, predicting that milk 
production in Ireland could increase by up to 39% post quota.  
 
Change will create opportunities for farmers to grow and redesign their businesses. 
Quota removal will require new innovative blueprints of milk production for dairy farmers 
capable of expanding milk production and taking cognisance of stronger international 
market forecasts for dairy products (OECD, 2007). The most profitable system of 
production will be that which gives the highest profit per unit of the most limiting input. 
When milk quotas are removed, other factors will become limiting such as land, stock, 
supplementary feed or labour availability thereby becoming the new quota. In such a 
scenario, technical innovation will be required as producers focus on achieving higher 
profit per hectare of farm land, per labour unit employed, per milking cow or per other 
farm specific factor. The challenge for Irish dairy farmers is to increase the 
competitiveness of their business through innovation, productivity gain and increased 
operational scale as the industry evolves. 
 
Similar agricultural reforms have occurred in many other countries. The deregulation of 
the Australian industry began in 1999 and has resulted in a reduction in dairy farm 
numbers with international prices now determining the price received by farmers for 
their milk. In New Zealand, the subsidy system was removed in 1984 and stimulated an 
expansion in production with increases in cow numbers and land conversions from other 
enterprises to dairying (Davison, 1996), reductions in input costs (Blandford and 
Dewbre, 1994), increases in productivity as farmers reduced expenditure and 
redistributed resources to areas of comparative advantage (Philpott, 1995). The detailed 
information necessary to accurately estimate the capacity for increased milk production 
on Irish dairy farms is not readily available however based on National farm survey 
statistics (NFS, 2006) the current average herd size is 52 cows out of a total of 80 
grazing livestock, on 40 hectares of land.  
 
The objective of this paper is to explore and quantify the potential for expansion on Irish 
dairy farms based on survey analysis, to describe the characteristics of profitable farm 
systems in future and explain the required changes to the system in preparation for an 
environment free from the constraints of milk quota. 
 
7.3 The Potential for Expansion on Irish dairy farms 
A survey was carried on over 1,430 dairy farmers supplying Glanbia, Connacht Gold, 
Lakeland and Donegal throughout 2007. The Glanbia survey was carried out in January 
and February while Connacht Gold, Lakeland and Donegal surveys were carried out from 
July to October. The surveys were carried out over the telephone with the farmers being 
posted the survey prior to the telephone call, explaining the process and the 
requirement for the information.  Seventy eight percent of the farmers contacted 
completed the survey. There was four objectives to the survey; 
 
1. Determine what was the potential for expansion on dairy farmers in terms of 
land areas around the milking platforms as well as other parcels of land. 
2. Determine what was the current labour availability and potential for a successor 
on dairy farms 
3. Determine the current status in Winter housing and milking facilities 
4. Determine what were the future in intentions of the farmers surveyed 
 
 
Table 7.1 shows some of the biological and attitudinal responses to the survey. Average 
milk quota size and area around the grazing platform were larger for the Glanbia 
suppliers when compared to the combination of Connacht Gold, Lakeland and Donegal. 
However the stocking rates were similar for the two regions at 1.78 and 1.79 cows/Ha. 
Horan and Shalloo (2007) have shown the optimum stocking rate in the future will be 
between 2.7 and 2.9 cows/Ha resulting in a potentially dramatic increase in output from 
these farms in the future. Milk production per cow and per hectare was similar in the 
two regions. As stated in this paper the target milk production per hectare will be 
15,000l showing huge scope for increasing output from existing land bases. The number 
of suppliers that stated they planned to expand was similar among the regions at 50% 
with slightly more stating that they planned to exit in the Glanbia region. However that 
may be factor of the survey timing rather than any real difference. When the total 
increase in output from the expanding farms is summed and the exiter’s removed the 
stated increase was 9% and 14% for the two regions. When the potential expansion 
was analysed based on the current land areas removing the exiter’s and producing 
15,000l/Ha, there was a potential increase 70% and 60% respectively. The definite lack 
of a successor was similar in the two regions with the remaining farmers either definitely 
having a successor or were unsure on whether there would be a successor or not.  
 
Table 7.1 Biological Results and Attitudinal Responses of a Survey of 1,400 
Regionally Distributed Dairy Farmers across 4 Co-operative areas carried out 
during 2007.  
 Glanbia Connacht Gold/ Donegal/ Lakeland 
Quota size (000, litres) 305,503 247,283 
Grazing Platform Area (ha) 38.9 30.5 
Stocking Rate (LU/ha) 1.78 1.79 
Milking cows (No.) 64.6 52.7 
Dairy specialisation (%) 0.63 0.70 
   
Milk production (kg/cow) 4,808 5,194 
                         (kg/ha) 8,346 9,212 
   
Proportion expanding (%)          49 50 
Proportion exiting (%)                14 9 
Stated expansion 9 14.5 
Potential expansion 70 60 
% No successor  25 29 
 
As indicated in the survey and based on best practice technologies, it can be anticipated 
that significant increases in dairy cow numbers could be accommodated on the existing 
land base with further increases in productivity achievable through improved animal 
genetics, compact calving, lengthened lactations and the provision of increased 
quantities of higher quality feed. 
 
7.4 Profitable Farm Systems for the Future 
Future farm systems will take the form of above average farmers leveraging debt to 
finance expansion and backing their ability and farming skills to generate the cash 
returns necessary to service the debt and deliver a satisfactory rate of return on there 
time and capital investment. The system must be sustainable in terms of staff, animals 
and the environment allowing for a quality lifestyle and providing for sufficient time-off 
for all staff. The system must therefore be simple and flexible allowing for increased 
operational scale to be achieved without requiring large amounts of additional labour. 
Future systems will require new industry targets for a non-quota environment with 
targets set with respect to profitability, productivity and labour efficiency (Table 7.2).   
 
Table 7.2. Key Performance Indicators (KPI) for the Irish Dairy Industry. 
Indicators  Current average** Target 
Milk solids per ha (kg) 660 1,250 
Labour (cows/LU) 44 100 
Labour cost/ha (€) 1,700 750 
Profit per ha* (€) 1,030 2,500 
Margin per kg milk solids (€) 1.56 2.00 
*KPI’s based on milk price projection of 26c/l, **based on National farm survey data 
(NFS, 2006)  
 
In future, most of the costs of milk production will be directly associated with the area 
of land being farmed, the number of cows in the herd and the number of people 
employed. Therefore, consistently high cash surpluses will be generated by ensuring 
that high levels of milk production are achieved per hectare, per cow and per labour 
unit. Successful dairy farms will optimise output/ha and the margin per unit of output. 
Output per ha will in future be measured in kg milk solids (MS) i.e. kg of fat and protein, 
as that is what is required and paid for by the dairy processor with 1,250 kg MS/ha a 
realistic target for an efficient grass based milk production system.  
 
A key economic principle, irrelevant of enterprise, is to optimise economic performance; 
one must achieve maximum profit per unit of the most limiting factor of production. 
Land will become the most limiting factor of production on most farms, hence profit per 
ha will be a key performance indicator of a successful dairy business with a realistic 
target of €2,500/ha. The second major variable determining profitability on a successful 
dairy farm will be margin per kg of milk solid (MS) produced. This is the margin available 
to pay for all of the unpaid resources employed, i.e. land, labour and capital. As MS yield 
per ha and per cow increase, initially there will be an increase in margin per kg MS 
because of a dilution in fixed costs and benefits in efficiency from scale. However, as MS 
output per ha approaches the optimum the margin will reduce due to a reducing 
proportion of the diet from grazed grass. A realistic target margin per kg of MS is 
approximately €2.00 where MS per ha is relatively high (>1,250 kg). A higher target 
margin would be realistic at milk prices in excess of 26c/l or where input costs can be 
reduced further.  
 
The availability of skilled labour capable of managing high performing dairy herds will 
also be a limitation in future and therefore dairy farms must adequately remunerate this 
skilled labour to compete with other sectors of the economy in sourcing and retaining 
staff. To achieve a high level of labour remuneration, a high output/labour unit is 
essential. A realistic target labour efficiency should be 22 hours per cow per year 
(O’Donovan et al., 2007) thereby allowing one operator to manage 100 cows. The 
overall labour cost target should therefore be €900 per hectare with an average labour 
cost of €15/hr worked for both skilled and unskilled labour. The realisation of labour 
performance targets will depend on the simplicity of the overall system and the 
introduction of new technologies to reduce labour input. 
 
7.5 The Changing Face of Farm Systems 
The realisation of key performance parameters outlined above will be determined by the 
ability of dairy farmers to employ technologies which deliver the desired performance for 
the future. Prior to the introduction of milk quotas in Ireland in the mid-1980’s, the 
optimum system of milk production was based on spring calving, stocking rate of 2.5 to 
3.0 cows/ha, a concentrate input of 500 to 750 kg/cow and a nitrogen application rate 
of 270 to 300 kg N/ha. Five key factors will determine if key performance indicators are 
achieved and will provide the solutions for managing or capturing benefits of the 
changing production environment. 
 
7.5.1. Stocking Rate 
“No more important force exists for good or evil than the control of stocking rate in 
grassland farming” Dr C. P. McMeekan, New Zealand (1961) 
 
In the previous section we have discussed the importance of milk productivity and why 
milk production from dairy farms will in future be limited by the land base available for 
the grazing dairy herd. Pasture is the main source of feed on a dairy farm therefore the 
hectare of pasture is a crude measure of feed supply on the farm. The choice of 
stocking rate remains the most important single decision which influences the pastoral 
dairy farms productivity. The optimum stocking rate is achieved where a balance is 
found between the amount of feed grown on the farm, the quality of the feed and the 
feed requirements of the herd. McMeekan (1956) and Rattray (1987) highlighted 
stocking rate as the major factor governing animal productivity from pasture due to its 
dominant effect on animal demand and hence pasture use. Maximum productivity of 
milk solids will be realised by achieving high milk solids yield per cow at relatively high 
stocking rates. A number of studies were carried out at Moorepark from 1978 to 1982 to 
measure milk production and stock carrying capacity. The results showed that increasing 
stocking rate from 2.5 to 2.7 cows/ha resulted in a reduction in milk yield per cow from 
4,717kg to 4,611kg, but in an increase in production per hectare from 11,651kg to 
12,678kg. Table 7.3 summarises a range of experiments carried out in New Zealand 
between 1982 and 1985 showing that as stocking rate is increased, milk solids 
production per cow declines but milk solids production per hectare increases. Other 
experiments show generally similar results with 1 additional cow/ha reducing MS by 
31kg per cow and increasing MS by 122kg per hectare (Holmes and MacMillan, 1982). 
Consistent with these results, a review of stocking rate experiments by Delaby et al. (per 
comm., 2007) has concluded that for each additional cow per hectare increase in 
stocking rate, milk production per hectare will be increased by 29, 24, 19 and 14%, 
going from 2 cows per hectare up to 5 cows per hectare.  
 
Table 7.3 The effect of stocking rate on pasture eaten and milk produced per 
cow and per hectare (where pasture growth is 16 tonnes per ha per annum). 
Cows per hectare 2.75 3.26 3.75 4.28 
Pasture eaten      per cow (t DM/cow/yr) 3.9 3.7 3.5 3.2 
                             per hectare (t DM/ha/yr) 10.8 11.9 13.0 13.9 
     
Milk solids produced (kg/cow) 359 328 300 269 
                                   (kg/ha) 991 1069 1128 1152 
     
Pasture Utilisation (%) 68 77 81 87 
Feed Conversion Efficiency (kg MS/t DM eaten) 92 88 86 84 
(Holmes et al., 2002) 
Increased farm stocking rates result in increased farm profitability on Irish dairy farms in 
the absence of milk quotas by increasing the utilization of grass grown on the dairy 
farm. A recent analysis by Horan and Shalloo (2007) of Irish pasture-based systems 
using the production data from the 5-year strain comparison studies from Curtins Farm, 
Moorepark (Horan et al. 2005; McCarthy et al., 2007) looked at the effects of increased 
stocking rate on milk production, feed requirement, land and labour utilisation and 
overall farm economic performance for a 40 hectare dairy farm in the absence of milk 
quotas. This analysis showed that increasing stocking rate (from 2.41LU/ha to 
2.65LU/ha) increased pasture utilisation from 75% to 85%, increased milk solids output 
from the 40 ha (from 34,676kg to 38,191 kg) and increased overall farm profitability. 
When pasture growth remains static, a 10% increase in pasture utilization resulted in 
€6,294 (€157/ha) and €10,224 (€255/ha) additional farm profit at a milk price of 22.3 
and 30.0 c/l, respectively (Table 7.4). Similar to previous studies (Penno et al., 1996; 
McCarthy et al., 2007), this analysis shows that based on various milk price projections 
in future years, higher stocking rate systems will be more profitable. Such systems will 
be characterised by their capability for low-cost high milk productivity per hectare with 
lesser milk production per cow. 
 
 
 
Table 7.4 The effect of herbage production per hectare and grass utilisation 
on key herd parameters in a fixed land scenario using anticipated future costs 
and prices (Horan and Shalloo, 2007). 
 Herbage utilisation (%)  75    85  
Herbage Production (t DM/ha) 12 14 16  12 14 16 
Utilisable herbage (t DM/ha) 9 10.5 12.0  10.2 11.9 13.6 
Total hectares (ha) 40.0 40.0 40.0  40.0 40.0 40.0 
Cows calving (No.) 77.2 87.3 96.9  85.4 96.2 106.4 
 Stocking rate (LU/ha) 2.14 2.42 2.68  2.36 2.66 2.94 
Labour units (h) 1.38 1.48 1.57  1.46 1.57 1.67 
Milk produced (kg) 452,794 512,044 567,764  500,486 564,153 623,653 
Milk sales (kg) 438,588 495,979 549,951  484,784 546,453 604,087 
Milk solids sales (kg) 30,735 34,756 38,538  33,972 38,293 42,332 
Fat sales (kg) 16,123 18,232 20,216  17,821 20,088 22,207 
Protein sales (kg) 14,612 16,524 18,322  16,151 18,205 20,125 
Labour costs (€) 31,466 33,778 35,952  33,327 35,811 38,133 
Feed costs /kg milk (c) 5.4 5.1 4.8  5.1 4.8 4.5 
Total costs (€) 100,519 108,018 115,062  106,317 114,348 121,851 
Milk Price at 22.3 c/litre         
Milk returns (€) 96,763 109,425 121,322  106,955 120,561 133,276 
Margin per cow (€) 151 216 265  205 262 305 
Margin per kg milk (c) 2.58 3.69 4.51  3.49 4.47 12.71 
Total profit/farm (€) 11,683 18,871 25,629  17,469 25,192 32,406 
Milk Price at 30 c/litre         
Milk returns (€) 131,458 147,654 163,721  145,304 162,680 179,837 
Margin per cow (€) 603 656 705  657 702 745 
Margin per kg milk (c) 10.29 11.20 12.03  11.20 11.98 12.71 
Total profit/farm (€) 46,590 57,333 68,277  56,052 67,568 79,252 
 
Increased utilization of pasture through increased stocking rates will be one avenue to 
increased productivity on Irish dairy farms in an expansion scenario. The maintenance of 
higher stocking rates requires flexible grazing management practices, feed demand 
management through stock movement and feed supplementation and feed supply 
management through the more efficient use of fertilizers and slurry to overcome the 
variability in pasture supply. The importance of supplementary feeds or strategic N 
fertilizer use to remove the constraints of pasture seasonality will depend on both the 
feed supply pattern, the price of supplementation and the price paid for additional milk 
product produced (Hodgson and Maxwell, 1988). Higher stocking rates can be facilitated 
on most farms by removing beef cattle, young stock and replacements from the grazing 
platform, reseeding pastures to increase grass growth rates, improving grassland 
budgeting, and making more strategic use of fertilizer and additional supplements. With 
the recent developments in grazing management technology on Irish dairy farms 
(O’Donovan et al., 2000), Irish dairy farmers who have acquired grass measurement and 
budgeting skills are well positioned to effectively manage and capture the economic 
benefits of higher stocking rates.  
 
7.5.2. Calving Date and Rate 
Systems of production based on a high proportion of in situ pasture utilization are 
constrained by the seasonality of pasture production (Heitschmidt, 1993), thereby 
requiring that animal production be fit within the cycle of annual grass supply (Dillon, 
1995). Within the confines of milk quotas where the total volume supplied is limited, the 
optimum mean calving date tends to be later thereby sacrificing overall farm milk 
production in order to use more cheap grazed grass to produce the fixed milk quota 
based on achieving a high profit per litre. While this principle is still important, the ability 
to increase overall production in a no quota scenario coupled with recent advances in 
grazing research showing that lower grass allocation levels in early lactation are 
sufficient to fully feed the dairy herd and achieve high animal performance (Kennedy et 
al., 2007; McEvoy et al., 2008) may have implications for the optimum calving date in a 
no quota scenario. In such a scenario, it will be possible to achieve greater production 
levels through earlier calving without reducing the proportion of grazed grass in the herd 
feed budget.  
 
The influence of variation in mean calving date on the profitability of Irish pasture-based 
production systems in a no quota scenario. In this analysis, grazed grass constituted 70, 
75, 72 and 71% of the dietary intake of cows with a mean calving date of January 31st, 
February 14th, March 1st and March 15th, respectively (Table 7.5). Earlier calving 
increases overall milk sales, milk revenues and costs of production. Feed costs are 
highest with January 31st calving, intermediate for March 1st and 15th calving and lowest 
with a mean calving date of February 14th. The highest farm profit was observed with a 
mean calving date of February 14th with the lowest profitability observed with a March 
15th calving date. With a mean calving date of February 15th, feed costs are lowest and 
margin per cow and per kg milk produced is maximised. Where the mean calving date is 
earlier than February 14th, the gains in milk receipts are outweighed by the increased 
feed costs incurred through increased silage and concentrate use in the diet. Where the 
mean calving date is later than February 14th, the losses in production and increased 
feed costs incurred result in a reduction in farm profitability. The economic optimum 
calving date in this analysis did not change with milk price variation however the relative 
advantage of achieving the optimum calving date is much greater in a low milk price 
scenario. 
 
Horan and Shalloo (2007) also looked at the influence of variability in calving rate on 
farm performance and profitability. Table 7.6 illustrates the influence of 4 alternative 42 
day calving rates with the same mean calving date. As calving rate is reduced, the 
proportion of grazed grass in the diet reduces with little effect on total milk or milk solids 
production. The total costs of production and feed costs per kg milk sales both increase 
as calving rate is reduced. The overall economic impact on the production system is to 
reduce total farm income by approximately €590 per 10% reduction in calving rate due 
to the higher associated costs of production. However as part of these assumptions 
calving date remains fixed which would be extremely difficult in reality. The real affect 
will be a slip in calving date as well as in the spread. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7.5. Key herd parameters in a fixed land base scenario using anticipated 
future costs and prices for four differing mean calving dates.  
Mean calving date 31st January 14th February 1st March 15th March 
Grass (kg DM/cow) 3,598 3,716 3,492 3,384 
Grass Silage (kg DM/cow) 1,034 935 1,071 1,131 
Concentrate (kg DM/cow) 477 334 322 265 
Cows calving (No.) 91.4 90.9 92.2 92.9 
Milk produced (kg) 546,095 533,080 517,772 503,175 
Milk sales (kg) 529,292 516,355 500,814 486,090 
Milk solids sales (kg) 37,113 36,184 34,977 33,859 
Fat sales (kg) 19,499 18,981 18,320 17,708 
Protein sales (kg) 17,614 17,203 16,657 16,151 
Livestock sales (€) 18,262 18,177 18,431 18,570 
Total costs (€) 115,547 110,674 111,333 110,618 
Feed costs /kg milk (c) 5.5 5.0 5.2 5.30 
Labour costs (€) 36,163 34,599 34,477 33,921 
Milk Price at 22.3 c/litre      
Milk returns (€) 116,782 113,920 110,091 106,562 
Margin per cow (€) 213 236 184 156 
Margin per kg milk (c) 3.57 4.02 3.28 2.88 
Total profit/farm (€) 19,497 21,423 16,966 14,514 
Milk Price at 30 c/litre      
Milk returns (€) 157,580 153,719 148,583 143,844 
Margin per cow (€) 663 676 604 560 
Margin per kg milk (c) 11.09 11.53 10.75 10.33 
Total profit/farm (€) 60,563 61,465 55,680 51,996 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7.6 Key herd parameters in a fixed land base scenario using anticipated 
future costs and prices for four differing calving patterns with the same mean 
calving date.  
6-week Calving Rate 90 75 60 45 
Grass (kg DM/cow) 3,624 3,586 3,552 3,496 
Grass Silage (kg DM/cow) 983 1,007 1,030 1,067 
Concentrate (kg DM/cow) 285 281 295 321 
Cows calving (No.) 91.5 91.7 91.9 92.2 
Milk produced (kg) 520,982 518,515 518,586 517,294 
Milk sales (kg) 504,150 501,645 501,686 500,337 
Milk solid sales (kg) 398 395 394 392 
Fat sales (kg) 18,466 18,355 18,353 18,306 
Protein sales (kg) 16,786 16,698 16,695 16,641 
Livestock sales (€) 18,294 18,335 18,368 18,430 
Total costs (€) 109,636 109,940 110,377 111,665 
Feed costs /kg milk (c) 5.0 5.0 5.1 5.3 
Labour costs (€) 34,087 34,043 34,192 34,469 
Milk Price at 22.3 c/litre      
Milk returns (€) 110,988 110,361 110,338 109,994 
Margin per cow (€) 212 204 197 182 
Margin per kg milk (c) 3.73 3.62 3.49 3.24 
Total profit/farm (€) 19,421 18,756 18,108 16,758 
Milk Price at 30 c/litre      
Milk returns (€) 149,781 148,941 148,913 148,452 
Margin per cow (€) 639 627 619 601 
Margin per kg milk (c) 11.22 11.10 10.97 10.72 
Total profit/farm (€) 58,438 57,557 56,903 55,438 
 
The optimum calving date for the herd will depend greatly on the grass growth 
characteristics of the farm. Ideally, the optimum date is the earliest possible date to 
allow a herd lactation length of 300 days while still preventing grass silage use in the 
milking cow diet. In the current analysis on a Moorepark type soil, the optimum mean 
calving date for the herd should be February 14th with calving commencing in late 
January. Also evident from this analysis, late January calving is preferable to March or 
April calving. The optimum mean calving date for a more northerly wetter soil will be 
later with calving commencing mid-February. While calving date will be very much 
dependant on soil type and location, achieving a high calving rate of 90% calving in 42 
days will be economically proficient regardless of geographic location. The average 
mean calving date of Irish spring-calving dairy cows is March 16th based on CMMS data 
(Table 7.7) with an average calving rate of 53% in 42 days (ICBF, 2006). While 
considerably later than the optimum as described above, these statistics show that the 
national mean calving date is now 8 days later than 2002. On the basis of the results 
obtained from Table 7. 4, it can be hypothesised that the average spring milk producer 
could increase total farm profitability by 18% by achieving a mid- February mean calving 
date. 
 
Table 7.7 Trends in the Mean Calving Date and proportion of cows calving by 
month within Irish Spring-calving Dairy Herds (2002-2006). 
Dept. Agriculture and Food CMMS Statistic Reports (2002-2006) 
Calving Month 2002 2004 2006 
January 0.10 0.11 0.10 
February 0.37 0.29 0.28 
March 0.30 0.28 0.29 
April 0.13 0.19 0.19 
May 0.07 0.11 0.10 
June 0.03 0.03 0.05 
Mean Calving Date 08-Mar 14-Mar 16-Mar 
 
7.5.3. Breeding Profitable Animals for the Future 
The dynamics of dairy farm expansion are far reaching. Among the factors that will limit 
the potential expansion of any dairy farm business, sourcing additional cows or incalf 
heifers will be a major limitation. Irish dairy farmers currently generate approximately 
240,000 replacement heifers each year (CMMS, 2007). This level of heifer rearing is 
insufficient to grow the national herd once quotas are removed. Currently, only 
approximately 30% of incalf heifers entering Irish dairy herds originate from AI, with the 
vast majority sired by stock bulls of inferior genetic potential. For those producers 
preparing to expand, purchasing additional cows is both expensive and has associated 
herd health risks. On that basis, the generation of additional quality replacements from 
within the herd is critical to fund future expansion on Irish dairy farms.  
 
Future farm systems will require a dairy cow of considerably higher economic value than 
the current average dairy cow. Compared to the current population, tomorrows herd will 
produce more milk solids through increased intake and energetic efficiency, achieve a 
365 day calving interval and require less labour per cow to survive in a larger herd. The 
performance potential of higher EBI sires has been well documented in recent years. For 
over ten years now, research comparing alternative strains of Holstein-Friesian dairy 
cattle on contrasting systems of milk production based predominantly on grazed grass 
have been underway at Moorepark (Buckley et al., 2000; Kennedy et al., 2003; Horan et 
al., 2005; McCarthy et al., 2007; Coleman et al., 2007). The most recently completed of 
these, a five-year study consisting of 585 lactations on 240 cows compared three strains 
of Holstein-Friesian. The three strains compared were high production North American 
(HP; EBI= €51), selected entirely for milk production, high durability North American 
(HD; EBI= €58), selected based on milk production, fertility and muscularity traits, and 
New Zealand (NZ; EBI= €58) selected from a seasonal calving pasture-based system.  
 
The three feed systems compared were a high grass allowance feed system typical of 
spring calving herds in Ireland (MP); a higher stocking rate system (HS) and an 
increased concentrate supplementation system (HC). The HP cows produced the highest 
yield of milk, the NZ the lowest, and the HD animals were intermediate. Milk fat and 
protein content were higher for the NZ strain than for the HP and HD strains. The milk 
production response to increased concentrate supplementation (MP v. HC) was greater 
with both the HP and HD strains (1.10 kg of milk/kg of concentrate for HP; 1.00 kg of 
milk/kg of concentrate for HD) compared to the NZ strain (0.55 kg of milk/kg of 
concentrate). The NZ strain had an earlier calving date, higher 24 day submission rate, 
higher pregnancy rate to first service, higher six week in-calf rate and lower empty rate 
than the HP strain.  
 
Figure 7.1 shows the profitability for the three strains across the three feed systems in a 
scenario where no milk quota existed and the 40ha land block was the limitation with a 
projected milk price of 22c/l and full labour costs included in the analysis. In this 
scenario, the NZ strain achieved the highest farm profit in all three feeding systems. The 
highest farm profit with the NZ strain was achieved in the high stocking rate feed 
system (€849/ha), the highest farm profit with the HD strain was achieved in the 
Moorepark feed system (€687/ha) while the HP strain achieved the highest farm profit in 
the high concentrate feed system (€471/ha). The results demonstrate how genetic 
selection for increased milk production (HP strain) results in reduced profitability in 
future years relative to selection on a combination of production and reproductive traits 
(HD and NZ strains). 
 
Figure 7.1. The Influence of strain of Holstein-Friesian and pasture-based 
feed system on farm profitability (McCarthy et al., 2007). [NZ (▲), HD (□) and 
HP (●)] 
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The efficiency of conversion of home grown feed to milk will be an important 
determinant of farm productivity especially considering the recent forecasts for 
supplementary feeds (Binfield et al., 2006). In a pasture based system the amount of 
milk produced from a given amount of feed is a measure of the efficiency of the system 
with many studies observing differences in feed efficiency among breeds of dairy cows. 
Improvements in the genetic ability of cows to produce more milk product from existing 
feed resources have contributed to the improved performance of grazing dairy systems 
in other countries (Holmes, 1988; Bryant, 1984). Ahlborn and Bryant (1992) compared 
the performance of Jersey and Friesian cows at low and high stocking rates (Figure 7.2). 
The Jersey cows produced similar or slightly lower yields of milk solids per cow but 
higher yields per hectare compared to the Friesian. While initially the milk production per 
hectare increased with the Friesian breed, there was a reduction in milk production per 
hectare at the higher stocking rates, while milk production per hectare increased with 
increasing stocking rate with the Jersey breed. Mackle et al. (1996) and Oldenbroek 
(1988) showed that Jersey cows were more efficient converters of grass DM into milk 
than the Holstein-Friesian. In a review of 11 experiments by Grainger and Goddard 
(2004), Jersey cows had higher DM intake per 100 kg live weight and in 8 of the 
experiments Jersey had higher feed conversion efficiency (g milk solids per kg of DM 
intake). 
 
Figure 7.2. The influence of cow breed on milk solids production per hectare 
of home grown feed at various stocking rates (Ahlborn and Bryant, 1992). 
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7.5.4. Grass Production, Quality and Grazing Management 
Animal productivity from grassland is determined by the amount of pasture grown, level 
of pasture utilisation and overall feed quality. Horan and Shalloo (2007) have shown that 
as pasture growth increased from 12 to 16 tonnes DM per hectare, the stock carrying 
capacity of the 40 hectares increases (from 2.25LU/ha to 2.81LU/ha) resulting in a 
proportional increase in milk solids produced (from 32,353kg to 40,435kg)(Table 7.4). 
While total costs increase due to the extra animals, feed costs per kg milk is reduced 
(from 5.3c/kg to 4.5c/kg) as additional grass is now grown for the same overall land 
rental and maintenance costs and the overall profitability of the system is increased. 
When pasture utilization is maintained, increasing total pasture growth increases farm 
profit by €3,610 (€90/ha) and €5,611 (€140/ha) where milk price is 22.3 and 30.0c/l, 
respectively. Similarly, as pasture quality increased from 75 to 87% organic matter 
digestibility (OMD), the stock carrying capacity of the 40 hectares increased resulting in 
a proportional increase in milk solids sales (Table 7.8). While total costs increase due to 
the extra animals, feed costs per kg milk are reduced. When pasture utilization is 
maintained, each 1% increase in OMD results in an increase in overall farm profit by 
€759 (€19/ha) and €1,229 (€31/ha) where milk price is 22.3 and 30.0c/l, respectively.  
 
Table 7.8. The effect of herbage Organic Matter Digestibility (OMD) on key 
herd parameters in a fixed land scenario using anticipated future costs and 
prices.  
Grass quality (% OMD) 75 78 81 84 87 
Total hectares (ha) 40.0 40.0 40.0 40.0 40.0 
Cows calving (No.) 78.7 82.0 85.3 88.5 91.6 
  Stocking rate(LU/ha) 1.18 2.27 2.36 2.45 2.53 
Labour units (No.) 1.39 1.42 1.46 1.49 1.52 
Milk produced (kg) 461,069 480,958 500,266 519,018 537,238 
Milk sales (kg) 446,604 465,868 484,571 502,735 520,383 
Milk solids sales (kg) 31,296 32,647 33,957 35,230 36,467 
Fat sales (kg) 16,417 17,126 17,813 18,481 19,130 
Protein sales (kg) 14,879 15,521 16,144 16,749 17,337 
Feed costs /kg milk (c) 5.30 5.20 5.10 5.00 4.90 
Labour costs (€) 31,789 32,565 33,318 34,050 34,761 
Total costs (€) 101,355 104,081 106,295 108,895 110,995 
Milk Price at 22.3 c/litre       
Milk returns (€) 98,532 102,782 106,908 110,915 114,809 
Margin per cow (€) 161 184 204 223 239 
Margin per kg milk (c) 2.75 3.14 3.49 3.80 4.08 
Total profit/farm (€) 12,687 15,100 17,443 19,717 21,927 
Milk Price at 30 c/litre       
Milk returns (€) 132,955 138,690 144,257 149,665 154,919 
Margin per cow (€) 602 624 645 663 680 
Margin per kg milk (c) 10.26 10.65 11.00 11.31 11.59 
Total profit/farm (€) 47,320 51,227 55,020 58,703 62,282 
 
Pasture growth will be increased on dairy farms by rejuvenating old swards through 
reseeding and ensuring that soil fertility is adequate for maximum plant growth. Grass 
breeding has increased DM yield by 0.5% per year in the Netherlands from 1965 to 
1990 (Van Wijk and Reheul, 1991). Gately (1984) compared an early perennial 
(Cropper) with a late perennial ryegrass (Vigour) for milk production at two stocking 
rates. At a low stocking rate, the improved digestibility of the Vigour gave 8.8% more 
milk yield than Cropper. However, at the higher stocking rates, Cropper gave 6.6% more 
milk than Vigour, because of the greater pasture production in early spring at the time 
of peak milk yield. 
 
Pasture quality can be improved through grazing management practice and the selection 
of higher quality grass varieties. During mid-season, Hurley et al. (2007) observed 
variability of up to 3 units in OMD between perennial ryegrass varieties of similar 
heading date. Thomson (1985) has shown that lax grazing reduces subsequent animal 
production performance, through a decline in feed quality. Tighter spring grazing has 
been shown to increase the milk production of dairy cows (Holmes and Hoogendoorn, 
1983; Hoogendoorn et al., 1985) in the following summer. Stakelum and Dillon, (1990) 
and Kennedy et al., (2006) have shown under Irish conditions that tightly grazed 
pastures in spring/early summer produced swards with a higher proportion of green leaf 
and lower proportion of grass stem and dead material compared to swards with low 
grazing pressure. Increasing post grazing sward surface height above 5 to 6 cm has 
been shown to result in a deterioration of sward quality in mid and late grazing season 
(Stakelum and Dillon, 1990).  
 
7.5.5. The Role of Supplementation in Future Systems 
The ability to avail of the increased profitability of pasture-based systems may be 
curtailed by land costs (both rental and purchase). Access to land at economically 
feasible prices is crucial to the future success of pasture based dairy systems. Increased 
feed supplementation may be an alternative expansion strategy for some producers 
where land availability is limited and therefore the development of efficient profitable 
pasture-based systems incorporating greater proportions of supplementary feeds also 
merits consideration. The use of imported supplementary feeds on many farms has 
introduced greater flexibility into the management of feeding, as pasture deficits caused 
by slower than expected growth can be filled by these other feeds thus meeting the 
requirements of both animals and pastures.  
 Table 7.9 illustrates the influence of increased concentrate supplementation on farm 
profitability at various concentrate prices and levels of milk production response where 
stocking rate is not increased in comparison to a base system at a similar concentrate 
purchase price. When stocking rate is held constant, increased concentrate 
supplementation relative to the base system results in reduced grass DM intake, 
increased milk production per cow and increased feed costs. At a low milk price 
(22.3c/l), increased concentrate supplementation results in a reduction in farm profit at 
concentrate prices of €250 per tonne or greater, regardless of the level of milk 
production response to concentrate supplementation (between 0.6 and 1 kg milk per kg 
concentrate). At a high milk price (30 c/l), increased concentrate supplementation 
relative to the base system results in an overall increase in farm profitability only where 
a response to concentrate of 1kg additional milk per kg additional concentrate fed is 
achieved and concentrate is purchased at €250 per tonne. Where a response of 0.6 to 
0.8 kg milk per kg additional concentrate is achieved or at a concentrate purchase price 
of €300 per tonne, increased concentrate supplementation will reduce overall farm 
profitability.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7.9 The effect of milk production response rate and concentrate price 
on the key herd parameters and farm profitability using anticipated future 
costs and milk prices where stocking does not increase. 
Concentrate costs 
€/tonne 
€250 €300 
Response to 
concentrate 
Base 0.60 0.80 1.00 Base 0.60 0.80 1.00 
Grass kg DM/ Cow 3,716 3,292 3,357 3,422 3,716 3,292 3,357 3,422 
Grass Silage kg 
DM/cow 
935 789 792 795 935 789 792 795 
Concentrate kg DM/cow 334 1,240 1,240 1,240 334 1,240 1,240 1,240 
Total hectares (ha) 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 
Milk yield Kg/cow 5,862 6,340 6,500 6,659 5,862 6,340 6,500 6,659 
# Cows calving (no.) 90.9 90.9 90.9 90.9 90.9 90.9 90.9 90.9 
 Stocking rate(LU/ha) 2.51 2.51 2.51 2.51 2.51 2.51 2.51 2.51 
Herbage used Kg 
DM/Ha 
11,056 9,589 9,765 9,943 11,056 9,589 9,765 9,943 
Labour units (h) 1.51 1.51 1.51 1.51 1.51 1.51 1.51 1.51 
Milk produced (kg) 533,080 576,323 590,805 605,286 533,080 576,323 590,805 605,286 
Milk sales (kg) 516,355 559,605 574,086 588,568 516,355 559,605 574,086 588,568 
Fat sales (kg) 18,981 20,573 21,105 21,638 18,981 20,573 21,105 21,638 
Protein sales (kg) 17,203 18,640 19,122 19,603 17,203 18,640 19,122 19,603 
Labour costs (€) 34,599 34,591 34,591 34,591 34,599 34,591 34,591 34,591 
Feed costs /kg milk (c) 5.0 7.8 7.5 7.3 5.3 8.5 8.3 8.1 
Total costs (€) 110,674 129,149 128,333 128,642 112,319 133,438 133,739 133,500 
Milk Price 22.3 c/Lt         
Milk returns (€) 113,920 123,449 126,639 129,829 113,920 123,449 126,639 129,829 
Margin per cow (€) 236 137 178 213 218 87 122 156 
Margin per kg milk (c) 4.02 2.16 2.74 3.20 3.71 1.37 1.87 2.35 
Total profit/farm (€) 21,423 12,470 16,205 19,357 19,797 7,917 11,069 14,221 
Milk Price 30 c/LT          
Milk returns (€) 153,720 166,578 170,883 175,188 153,720 166,578 170,883 175,188 
Margin per cow (€) 676 615 668 715 658 564 611 659 
Margin per kg milk (c) 11.53 9.69 10.28 10.74 11.23 8.90 9.41 9.89 
Total profit/farm (€) 61,465 55,862 60,720 64,994 59,839 51,310 55,584 59,858 
 
Table 7.10 illustrates the influence of increased concentrate supplementation on farm 
profitability at various concentrate prices and levels of milk production response where 
stocking rate is increased in comparison to a base system at a similar concentrate 
purchase price. In this scenario, increased concentrate supplementation results in 
reduced grass DM intake per cow, increased milk production per cow, increased cow 
numbers on the 40 ha (i.e. an increase in stocking rate), increased labour input and 
costs, increased feed costs and increased total costs of production. At a low milk price 
(22.3 c/l), additional concentrate supplementation will only result in increased farm 
profitability where concentrate is purchased at €250 per tonne and a milk production 
response of greater than 0.8kg of additional milk is realised per kg additional 
concentrate fed above the base level. At a milk production response of 0.6kg/kg or 
where concentrate purchase price is €300 per tonne, increased concentrate 
supplementation will result in a reduction in farm profitability. Where milk price of 30c/l 
is achieved, additional concentrate supplementation results in increased farm profitability 
for all milk production responses and for concentrate purchase prices of €250 and €300 
per tonne. 
 
Systems of production based on supplementation at pasture must be clearly defined to 
ensure that supplementation is efficient and does not lead to a reduction in pasture 
utilization on the dairy farm. It is envisaged that the cost of external supplements will 
continue to increase due mainly to increases in contractor charges associated with 
inflation in labour, energy and machinery costs. The profitability of supplement inclusion 
will be determined by the milk to concentrate price ratio and the level of additional milk 
production achieved in response to supplementation. If the market value of the 
additional milk achieved outweighs the costs of supplement inclusion and pasture 
utilisation is not compromised, higher supplementation levels may yield greater farm 
profit. However, if milk price reduces, the economic feasibility of concentrate use within 
the dairy feed budget declines as the marginal benefit of increased milk output is 
outweighed by the cost of the additional supplementation.  
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7.10. The effect of milk production response rate and concentrate price 
on the key herd parameters using anticipated future costs and milk prices 
where stocking rate increases. 
Concentrate costs 
€/tonne 
€250 €300 
Response to 
concentrate 
Base 0.60 0.80 1.00 Base 0.60 0.80 1.00 
Grass kg DM/ Cow 3,716 3,292 3,357 3,422 3,716 3,292 3,357 3,422 
Grass Silage kg 
DM/cow 
935 1,240 792 795 935 1,240 792 795 
Concentrate kg 
DM/cow 
334 789 1,240 1,240 334 789 1,240 1,240 
Total hectares (ha) 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 
Milk yield per cow (Kg) 5,862 6,340 6,500 6,659 5,862 6,340 6,500 6,659 
Cows calving (No.) 90.9 101.8 100.3 98.9 90.9 101.8 100.3 98.9 
 Stocking rate(LU/ha) 2.51 2.81 2.77 2.73 2.51 2.81 2.77 2.73 
Labour units (h) 1.51 1.62 1.61 1.59 1.51 1.62 1.61 1.59 
Milk produced (kg) 533,080 645,159 651,937 658,478 533,080 645,159 651,937 658,478 
Milk sales (kg) 516,355 626,444 633,488 640,291 516,355 626,444 633,488 640,291 
Fat sales (kg) 18,981 23,030 23,289 23,540 18,981 23,030 23,289 23,540 
Protein sales (kg) 17,203 20,867 21,100 21,326 17,203 20,867 21,100 21,326 
Labour costs (€) 34,599 37,074 36,742 36,418 34,599 37,074 36,742 36,418 
Feed costs /kg milk (c) 5.0 7.5 7.30 7.10 5.3 8.4 8.10 8.00 
Total costs (€) 110,674 139,114 137,435 135,844 112,319 145,289 142,804 141,431 
Milk Price at 22.3 c/litre         
Milk returns (€) 113,920 138,193 139,743 141,239 113,920 138,193 139,743 141,239 
Margin per cow (€) 236 188 223 251 218 130 166 195 
Margin per kg milk (c) 4.02 2.96 3.43 3.78 3.71 2.05 2.56 2.93 
Total profit/farm (€) 21,423 19,124 22,357 24,859 19,797 13,244 16,689 19,272 
Milk Price at 30 
c/litre  
        
Milk returns (€) 153,720 186,473 188,564 190,584 153,720 186,473 139,743 141,239 
Margin per cow (€) 676 665 713 753 658 608 656 697 
Margin per kg milk (c) 11.53 10.49 10.96 11.31 11.23 9.58 10.09 10.47 
Total profit/farm (€) 61,465 67,699 71,478 74,506 59,839 61,819 65,810 68,919 
 
 
Ultimately, future farm systems must be based on achieving consistently high profit 
margins regardless of the wider financial climate, and therefore within a volatile milk 
price environment, it is our recommendation from this analysis that producers should 
initially focus on achieving high performance from high margin low cost systems based 
on the maximum utilization of grazed grass and limited use of alternative feeds. Only 
when this base system is developed and managed to a consistently high standard should 
greater supplementation be considered in a favourable economic climate. 
 
7.6 Financial Implications of High Performance Technology on Surveyed 
Farms 
Based on survey data outlined in table 7.1, it is possible to estimate the financial 
implications of technical improvement on Irish dairy farms. Through the combination of 
the removal of non-dairy stock, increasing the overall stocking rate on the grazing 
platform to 2.8cows/Ha, achieving the optimum calving date, breeding better quality 
animals and better feed management (grass and purchased supplement), it is estimated 
that the profitability of the surveyed farms could increase by €1,800 per ha (Table 7. 
11). This increase in profit could be further enhanced by continued genetic improvement 
of the herd, superior grazing management and making more strategic use of 
supplements. 
 
 
Table 7.11. Biological and Financial Implications* of Technological 
Improvement on Surveyed dairy farms. 
 Survey Average Potential Profit Differential (€)/Ha 
Milk yield (kg/ha) 8,684 15,000 1,000 
Mean calving date March 17th Feb 15th 250 
Breeding (Herd EBI; €) 42 80 400 
Feed costs (c/kg DM grown) 8 5.5 300 
* based on milk price of 30c/l 
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Appendix 1: Details of Adjustment Costs  
 
 
The first stage of expansion up to the threshold level Xi involves increasing cow numbers 
by disposing of Non-Dairy livestock (ND) – typically beef cattle.6  To allow for 
replacements each non-dairy livestock unit is equal to one dairy cow less the farm’s herd 
replacement rate ( iRP
Yiel
). The quantity of extra milk then depends on the yield record on 
farm i in period t ( ). Hence, the extent of this expansion differs with each farmer’s 
resource base and technical efficiency; this is expressed as follows; 
itd
 
0.5 (1 ) ( )i i i itX ND RP Yield          (1) 
 
The incremental adjustment cost per litre ( ) for farm i associated with this stage of 
expansion are derived from:  
ixC
o Replacing a beef livestock unit with dairy results in a net increase in labour of 23 
hours per cow.  The cost of extra labour (Waget) is assumed to be €12 per hour, 
increasing over subsequent time periods according to projected wage rate 
inflation.  
o Infrastructure costs in the first expansion stage (InfraX) comprise the conversion 
of existing non-dairy accommodation (estimated cost of €300 per cow) plus 
upgrading of dairy facilities (estimated cost of €406 per cow).   
o Infrastructure costs are fully written-down over a 10-year period on a straight-line 
basis.  The investment is financed using a 10-year term loan at an interest rate of 6 
per cent.  Interest in each year for the amortized loan is computed by applying the 
appropriate period compound interest factor (IntFact) to the sum invested.  
o The cost of retaining additional replacement heifers.  
o The foregone profit per livestock unit on Non-Dairy livestock (NDProf), 
excluding the decoupled payment, is estimated from NFS data. In 2006, the 
average profit per beef livestock unit was €103.  
                                                 
6 As data on land fragmentation is not available, it is assumed that only half of the non-dairy stock can be 
replaced with dairy cows.   
 Thus the adjustment cost per litre of quota investment in this stage would be:   
23( ) (0.1 )( ) (1 )
( )
t t it
ix
it
Wage IntFac InfraX NDprof RPC
Yield
    i       (2) 
 
The second stage of expansion which occurs after threshold Xi is more costly as it 
involves acquiring additional land and increasing overall livestock numbers. The costs 
are as follows;  
 
o Land rental costs are estimated to be €268 per year hectare (Rent). The additional 
land required is dependent on the stocking rate of the farm (SRi). 
o Full labour costs are assumed in this expansion stage involving annual input of 35 
hours per cow.  The wage rate (Waget) is €12 per hour in the first time period and 
increases in subsequent time periods.  
o Infrastructure costs (InfraY) in the second stage involve expansion of milking 
facilities and construction of new housing at a combined cost of €1,633 per 
additional cow. 
o Infrastructure costs are fully written-down over a 20-year period on a straight-line 
basis.  The investment is financed using a 20-year term loan at an interest rate of 6 
per cent.  Interest in each year for the amortized loan is computed by applying the 
appropriate period compound interest factor (IntFact) to the sum invested.  
o Additional cows are purchased for an average price of €1,320 (CowCost) and the 
interest rate (Intt) on capital invested in the extra cows is assumed to be 6 per 
cent.  
 
Therefore, the incremental adjustment cost per litre of quota investment in this stage can 
be written as:   
35( ) (0.1 )( ) (1 )( )
( )
t t t
i
iy
it
Rent Wage IntFac InfraY Int CowCostSR
C
Yield
          (3) 
 
